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The Puzzling Non-Consequences of
Societal Distrust of Courts: Explaining
the Use of Russian Courts
Kathryn Hendley'
Russians' lack of trust in courts as an institution has been repeatedly
documented through public opinion polling. Yet the caseload data show a
steady increase in the use of courts by both individuals and firms in Rus-
sia. But these data cannot explain why Russians choose to use the courts.
The Article makes use of two publicly available datasets grounded in repre-
sentative surveys of Russian citizens and firms to investigate this puzzle.
The existing literature assumes that the lack of legitimacy of courts in Rus-
sia forestalls use. While confirming the societal disdain for courts, the
analysis reveals that this attitude has little effect on behavior. Instead, a
complicated mixture of need and capacity drives the use of the courts. Two
publicly available datasets were used: the EBRD-World Bank Business Envi-
ronment and Enterprise Performance Survey and the Russian Longitudinal
Monitoring Survey, RLMS-HSE.
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Introduction
Why do individuals and firms go to court? Litigation is rarely the
easiest way to resolve a dispute.' As compared to informal dispute-resolu-
tion mechanisms, the courts typically cost more,2 take longer,3 and risk
fracturing any pre-existing relationship between the parties.4 Yet judicial
decisions can be preferable because they provide clarity as to which party
prevailed, which is often obscure in negotiated settlements. Judicial deci-
sions also carry with them the power of state enforcement. Each possible
approach to resolving disputes, whether informal or formal, has its pluses
and minuses. Further complicating the calculation of how to proceed are
the inevitable quirks within various national systems. Courts exist within
a complex institutional environment.5 The reasons prompting litigation in
1. See, e.g., HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE Do AND THINK A3OUT
GOING To LAW (1999).
2. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 146 (1974); Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H.
Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1267, 1275 (2005); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (1984); Charles Silver, Does CivilJustice Cost Too Much?,
80 TEx. L. REv. 2073, 2073-74 (2002).
3. On the impact of delays on the propensity to litigate, see Michael Heise, Justice
Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
813, 814-16 (2000).
4. Parties in long-term relationships, whether business or personal, are reluctant to
take their disputes to court for fear of rupturing their relationships-a fact well docu-
mented in the context of the United States. See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND
GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLAss AMERICANS 2-3 (1990);
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. REV. 55, 64 (1963). Whether this reluctance is present in less adversarial systems is
unclear. See Kathryn Hendley, Business Litigation in the Transition: A Portrait of Debt
Collection in Russia, 38 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 305, 305 (2004) ("[Tlhose who have long-
term, trust-based relationships avoid the courts . .. [due in part to] fear of disrupting
ongoing relationships . . . ."). See generally SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS & GEN-
DER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2006).
5. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
(1981).
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one socio-political context might play out very differently in another.6
Even so, the basic motivations for using (or not using) the courts can be
best assessed in terms of need, capacity, and belief. This Article is devoted
to exploring these three hypotheses. The existence of a dispute is certainly
a necessary condition for litigation. But is it sufficient? The relationship
between need and use is far from automatic. Courts everywhere tend to be
a last resort. Most litigants, whether firms or individuals, prefer to resolve
disputes privately.7 This suggests that need alone is insufficient to compel
use, though the extent to which it explains use is worth exploring. The
second hypothesis focuses on the capacity of the litigants. The socio-legal
literature has established that the level of experience and knowledge that
litigants have of the courts can affect use.8 Yet Galanter's seminal article,
Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead, reminds us that being a "have" does not
necessarily translate into more use. Rather, the "haves" are able to make
more informed choices about when to litigate.9 The third hypothesis posits
that litigants' attitudes regarding law and courts will determine their use of
the courts. This hypothesis is grounded in the unstated assumptions of
the literature. Policy makers and scholars alike seem to assume that a dis-
affection or disdain for law translates into an unwillingness to use the
courts.' 0 The lack of legitimacy of courts in countries making the transi-
tion away from state socialism is frequently assumed to explain low levels
of use." This reasoning is intuitively appealing. After all, why would a
firm or individual turn to an institution they do not trust for help? The
strength of this relationship between distrust and non-use deserves further
6. For example, Blankenberg's comparative study of debt collection in Germany
and the Netherlands illustrates how the same mechanism has resulted in different litiga-
tion patterns due to a few key differences between the two legal systems. Erhard Blank-
enburg, The Infrastructure for Avoiding Civil Litigation: Comparing Cultures of Legal
Behavior in the Netherlands and West Germany, 28 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 789, 789 (1994).
The availability of legal expertise can also affect demand. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield,
Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape
for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 129, 134-36, 139-40 (2010); Herbert M.
Kritzer, Examining the Real Demand for Legal Services, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 255, 256
(2010).
7. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming. . ., 15 LAw & Soc'v REv. 631, 636 (1981).
8. See, e.g., Kathryn Hendley, Beyond the Tip of the Iceberg: Business Disputes in
Russia, in ASSESSING THE VALUE OF LAW IN TRANSITION EcoNoMIEs 20-55 (Peter Murrell
ed., 2001); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EvEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUS-
NESs AMONG WORKING-CLASs AMERICANS (1990); Kelley E. Cormier, Grievance Practices in
Post-Soviet Kyrgyz Agriculture, 32 LAw & Soc. INQuRY 435 (2007); David M. Engel,
Globalization and the Decline of Legal Consciousness: Torts, Ghosts, and Karma in Thai-
land, 30 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 469 (2005).
9. See Galanter, supra note 2, at 103.
10. See generally GENN, supra note 1; Tom R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW
(1990); Kristina Murphy, The Role of Trust in Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Accused
Tax Avoiders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 187 (2004); Sheilagh Ogilvie, The Use and Abuse of
Trust: Social Capital and its Deployment by Early Modern Guilds (CESifo Grp., Working
Paper No. 1302, 2004), 1 JAHRBUCH FOR WIRTSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE 15 (2005).
11. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Hay & Andrei Shleifer, Private Enforcement of Public Laws:
A Theory of Legal Reform, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 398, 401 (1998).
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investigation. Perhaps need or capacity trumps any lack of legitimacy of
the courts.
In this Article, I investigate these three hypotheses in the context of
contemporary Russia. The well-documented imperfections of Russia's judi-
cial system make it a hard case.12 The legitimacy of the courts within Rus-
sian civil society is minimal at best. Skepticism about Russian courts is
nothing new. Russians have long bemoaned the lack of independence of
their courts. Such complaints date back to the Tsarist period, continued
through the Soviet period, and persist to the present day. t3 Evidence sup-
porting these complaints is abundant. In all these eras, the record docu-
ments the courts' willingness to follow the lead of the political elites in
resolving disputes when faced with cases that have political implications.
Although the prevalence of such cases is almost impossible to determine
due to the difficulty of knowing whether a case has political overtones,14
12. For an overview of the legal system of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, see
generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET LAW
(1966). For an intellectual history that examines the roots of the 1853 reforms to the
Russian judicial system, see RICHARD S. WORTMAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RUSSIAN LEGAL
CONSCIOUSNESS 5 (1976). Critiques of the Soviet system are legion. See, e.g., YURI FEOFA-
NOV & DONALD D. BARRY, POLITICS AND JUSTICE IN RUSSIA: MAJOR TRIALS OF THE POST-
STALIN ERA 3-7 (1996); DINA KAMINSKAYA, FINAL JUDGMENT: My LIFE AS A SOVIET DEFENSE
ATTORNEY 14 (Michael Glenny trans., 1982); KONSTANTIN M. SIMIs, USSR: THE CORRUPT
SOCIETY 24-25 (Jacqueline Edwards & Mitchell Schneider trans., 1982); Peter H. Solo-
mon, Jr., Judicial Power in Russia: Through the Prism of Administrative Justice, 38 LAw &
Soc'Y Rev. 549, 563 (2004). Critiques of the Soviet system by Russians became possible
in the late 1980s, as the parameters of public discourse expanded under Gorbachev's
perestroika policy. See, e.g., Kakim dolzhen byt' pravovoe gosudarstvo, LITERATURNAIA
GAZETA, June 8, 1988, at 11. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, critical assessments
of the system have become commonplace among both Russian and Western scholars.
See generally E.B. ABRASIMOVA, OCHERKI ROSSIISKOGO SUDOSTROISTVA: REFORMY I
REZUL'TATY (2009); PETER H. SOLOMON,JR., SOVIET CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER STALIN (1996).
13. Western and Russian scholars frequently reference Aleksandr Herzen's comment
from the nineteenth century about the role of law:
Legal insecurity that has hung over our people from time immemorial has been
a kind of school for them. The scandalous injustice of one half of the law has
taught them to hate the other half; they submit only to force . . . . Whatever his
station, the Russian evades or violates the law wherever he can do so with impu-
nity; the government does exactly the same thing.
Eugene Huskey, A Framework for the Analysis of Soviet Law, 50 Russ. REv. 53, 68 (1991)
(citing Aleksandr Herzen, Du Developpement des Iddes Revolutionnaires en Russie (1851),
in 7 COLLECTED WORKS IN THIRTY VOLUMES 121 (1954-61)); V.A. Tumanov, 0 pravovom
nigilzme, 10 SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAvo 20, 24 (1989) (citing Aleksandr Herzen, Du
Developpement des Idees Revolutionnaires en Russie (1851), in 7 COLLECTED WORKS IN
THIRTY VOLUMES 121 (1954-61)).
14. The well-publicized show trials of the Soviet era present obvious examples of
politicized cases. See, e.g., FEOFANOV AND BARRY, supra note 12, at 314; VALERYII
CHALIDZE, To DEFEND THESE RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOVIET UNION 24 (Guy Dan-
iels trans., 1975); KAMINSKAYA, supra note 12, at 174; ANDREI SINIAVSKII, ON TRIAL: THE
SOVIET STATE VERSUS "ABRAM TERTZ" AND "NIKOLAl ARZHAK" (Max Hayward trans. and ed.,
1967). For insight into how these trials were conducted, see JULIE A. CASSIDAY, THE
ENEMY ON TRIAL: EARLY SOVIET COURTS ON STAGE AND SCREEN 28-29 (2000); ELIZABETH A.
WOOD, PERFORMING JUSTICE: AGITATION TRIALS IN EARLY SOVIET RUSSIA 2-7 (2005). Soviet
history is replete with examples of criminal prosecutions that could be seen as politically
motivated, but these were so common that few saw them in this light. Pomorski docu-
mented the practice of padding reports (ochkovtiratel'stvo or "eye washing") to adminis-
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this practice reached its apex under Stalin.15 The number of politicized
cases decreased dramatically under Khrushchev and Brezhnev,16 though
the memoir literature reveals the persisting practice of handling politicized
cases in a qualitatively different way from non-politicized cases, which
inevitably compromised the ability of those involved to realize their legal
rights.' 7 In an effort to enhance judicial independence, Soviet legislators
began a series of institutional reforms of the judicial system in the late
1980s.18 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian legislators have
continued to tinker with the courts' institutional structure and the rules
governing judicial selection, compensation, retention, and discipline.' 9
Yet, the Yukos case vividly demonstrates that in politically sensitive cases,
judicial independence remains elusive. 20 Corruption within the judicial
corps continues to pose a serious problem. 2' At the same time, few would
question that the present-day Russian courts do a better job of living up to
the ideals of independence and competence than did their Soviet counter-
parts. Fewer still would dispute that much work remains to be done.
Much of the literature dealing with Russian courts, both scholarly and
mass media, assumes that these glaring shortcomings make the Russian
courts unappealing to Russian citizens and firms. In a March 2011 speech
in Moscow, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden challenged Russia to improve
the independence of its courts, referencing the Khodorkovsky case among
others.22 Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev's public statements indicate
that he is supportive of greater judicial integrity, though whether he has
the political will or power to effect change is unclear. As President, he
implicitly criticized the process surrounding Khodorkovsky by conceding
that releasing Khodorkovsky would provide no public danger.23 Along
trative superiors-a technically illegal practice in which most state-owned enterprises
engaged regardless. The practice was mostly overlooked, but was occasionally prose-
cuted to send a signal that it was being overused. See Stanislaw Pomorski, Crimes Against
the Central Planner: "Ochkovtiratel'stvo," in SOVIET LAW AFTER STALIN: PART 11: SOCIAL
ENGINEERING THROUGH LAw 273, 291-312 (Donald D. Barry et al. eds., 1978).
15. See Solomon, supra note 12, at 563.
16. Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Soviet Politicians and Criminal Prosecutions: The Logic of
Party Intervention, in CRACKS IN THE MONOLITH: PARTY POWER IN THE BREZHNEV ERA 3, 5
(James R. Millar ed., 1992).
17. See KAMINSKAYA, supra note 12, at 174.
18. See PETER H. SOLOMON, JR. & TODD S. FOGLESONG, COURTS AND TRANSITION IN
RUSSIA: THE CHALLENGE OF JUDICIAL REFORM 8-9 (2000).
19. See id. at 10-15; Alexei Trochev, Judicial Selection in Russia: Towards Accountabil-
ity and Centralization, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PER-
SPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 375-76 (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds.,
2006).
20. See RICHARD SAKWA, THE QUALITY OF FREEDOM: KHODORKOVSKY, PUTIN, AND THE
YUKOS AFFAIR 30-70 (2009). See generally MARTIN SIXSMITH, PUTIN'S OIL: THE YUKOS
AFFAIR AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RUSSIA (2010).
21. Ass'n of Russian Lawyers for Human Rights, Russia: Corruption in the Courts,
RUsADvOcAT, http://rusadvocat.com/node/130 (last visited June 17, 2012).
22. Ellen Barry, Plain Speaking from Biden in Moscow Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/world/europe/1lbiden.html.
23. For a video of Medvedev's statement, which he made during a public question-
and-answer session in mid-May 2011, see Medvedev: Khodorkovsky No Danger, YouTUBE
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similar lines, Prime Minister Medvedev has made stamping out corruption
in the legal system one of his signature issues, linking this to the goal of
improving the investment climate in Russia.24 He has also frequently
lamented the persistence of legal nihilism among Russians.25
This complaint about Russians' disaffection for law is nothing new. 26
The widespread perception that the Russian legal system is flawed beyond
repair has contributed to Russia's unenviable position near the bottom of
most comparative indexes that purport to measure various aspects of the
rule of law.27 In an analysis of the twenty largest countries by population
by the World Bank's indicator for rule of law, Russia is ranked in the lowest
quartile, along with Ethiopia, Iran, Pakistan, and Nigeria. It ranks below
countries such as Bangladesh, Mexico, Egypt, and China.28
The Russian courts' blatant manipulation of a series of high-profile
cases has led many scholars and policy-makers to believe that the courts
are untrustworthy and unusable.29 This analysis assumes that these cases
(May 18, 2011), www.youtube.com/watch?v=KwoylzJcLr0. Medvedev was reacting to
the decision of the appellate court to affirm Khodorkovsky's conviction in his second
trial. His statement represents a break with Prime Minister Putin. The relationship
between Medvedev and Putin, which has often been referred to as a "tandemocracy," has
been the subject of much speculation, both in Russia and the West. Why Medvedev
spoke more favorably about Khodorkovsky than did most Kremlin officials is unclear. It
is worth noting that an even-handed documentary on the Khodorkovsky case aired on
the state-controlled NTV channel in May 2011. See Yulia Latynina, When Making a
Profit Is a Crime, Moscow TIMES (June 1, 2011), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opin-
ion/article/when-making-a-profit-is-a-crime/437915.html.
24. Olga Skabeeva, Prezident pogovoril s chelnami Obschchestvennoi palaty o
vziathakh, sudakh i kul'turntykh kodakh, VESTI (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.vesti.ru/
doc.html?id=422022; Medvedev o horrupcii v sudah, NAGAYCEV, http://nagaycev.ru/
vazhnoe/medvedev-o-korrupcii-v-sudax/ (last visited June 17, 2012). Corruption is not
just a post-Soviet phenomenon, but was also a reality of life in the Soviet era. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM A. CLARK, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN SOVIET OFFICIALDOM: COMBATING CORRUP-
TION IN THE POLITICAL ELITE 1965-1990 10-11 (1993); SIMIs, supra note 12, at 24-25.
25. Polnyi tekst vystupleniia Dmitriia Medvedeva na II Grazhdanskom forume v Moshve
22 ianvaria 2008 goda, ROSSIYSKAIA GAZETA (Jan. 24, 2008), http://www.rg.ru/2008/01/
24/tekst.html.
26. Huskey, supra note 13, at 53-54; Tumanov, supra note 13, at 24.
27. In an analysis of the twenty largest countries by population by the World Bank's
indicator for rule of law, Russia is ranked in the lowest quartile, along with Ethiopia,
Iran, Pakistan, and Nigeria. It ranks below countries such as Bangladesh, Mexico,
Egypt, and China. See Transparency Int'l, Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, TRANS-
PARENCY, http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/surveys-indices/cpi/2010/
results (Russia is tied at 154 of 176 countries with, among others, Tajikistan, Kenya,
Laos, and Cambodia) (last visited Sept. 29, 2012); see also World Bank, World Wide
Governance Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/pdf/wgidataset.xls
(last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
28. World Bank, supra note 27.
29. The most notorious example is, of course, the series of cases involving Yukos
and its top managers. See supra note 20. Other examples from recent years include the
criminal prosecution of Sergei Magnitsky, whose death in November 2009 while in pre-
trial detention continues to be a cause celebre. Magnitsky's former employer, William F.
Browder, the executive director of Hermitage Capital, characterized the decision not to
prosecute the prison officials who refused medical treatment to Magnitsky as evidence
of "the incredible lack of justice in Russia." Michael Schwirtz, In Russia, Charges are
Dropped in Jail Death, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 9, 2012, at A4. Russian officials who were
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reveal the essence of the Russian judicial system. In a series of papers, I
have argued that the truth is more complicated. Building on the pioneering
fieldwork of scholars such as Jane Burbank and George Feifer from the
Tsarist and Soviet periods, respectively, I have characterized the Russian
legal system as dualistic. 30 The instrumentalism that politicized cases evi-
dence exists in uneasy harmony with the vast majority of mundane cases
that courts resolve in accord with the written law. My research, which is
based on focus groups and interviews with ordinary Russians, suggests
that these Russians are sufficiently savvy to appreciate the unspoken dif-
ferences between these various categories of cases.3 ' They also have a cul-
turally derived understanding of when corruption is likely to play a role in
a case. Quite understandably, they avoid the courts in such circumstances.
But the incidence of such cases, as compared with the overall number of
cases brought to the courts, is relatively small.
The caseload data support this position. Individuals and firms are
flocking to the courts in ever-greater numbers. Cases involving individuals
are heard by the courts of general jurisdiction. The number of civil cases
that the courts of general jurisdiction decided more than doubled between
2000 and 2010.32 The Russian judicial system segregates cases involving
firms in a separate hierarchy of specialized courts, known as arbitrazh
courts. The number of claims brought to the arbitrazh courts between
2000 and 2010 has risen by approximately 70%.3 These data give rise to
a puzzle. Given the official view of courts as lapdogs to the Kremlin, why
do Russians continue to use them?3 4 What explains this willingness to use
involved in this case have been denied U.S. visas. Andrew E. Kramer, Russians Tied to
Jail Death are Barred from the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2011, at A7. Russian authorities
have responded by pushing forward with a posthumous prosecution. Andrew E.
Kramer, Russia Plans to Prosecute Dead Lawyer in Tax Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012, at
A4. Less well-known in the West, but well-publicized in Russia, is the death of Vera
Trifonova in pre-trial detention due to the authorities' refusal to allow her medical treat-
ment. Ol'ga Romanova, Kto ubil Trifonovu, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.forbes.
ru/column/49063-kto-ubil-veru-trifonovu. The most welt-known of these high-profile,
politically-inspired cases of the Yeltsin era was brought against Vladimir Gusinsky.
David Hoffman, Russia Hits Tycoon With a New Lawsuit; Gusinsky's Empire Faces Tax
Assault, WASH. PosT, Dec. 16, 2000, at A23. The editorial writers for the Washington Post
described the case as "pure pretense." Editorial, An Unwarranted Arrest, WASH. PosT,
Dec. 13, 2000, at A46.
30. JANE BURBANK, RUSSIAN PEASANTS Go TO COURT: LEGAL CULTURE IN THE COUNTRY-
SIDE, 1905-1917 2-5 (2004); GEORGE FEIFER, JUSTICE IN Moscow 256-57 (1964).
31. Kathryn Hendley, 'Telephone Law' and the 'Rule of Law': The Russian Case, 1
HAGUE J. RULE L. 241, 258 (2009).
32. For an overview of caseload trends in the Russian courts of general jurisdiction,
see data available at Judicial Statistics, JUD. DEPARTMENT SUP. CT. Russ. FED'N, http://
www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=5 (last visited June 17, 2012).
33. For an overview of caseload trends in the Russian arbitrazh courts, see Higher
Arbitrazh Ct. Russ. Fed'n, http://www.arbitr.ru/press-centr/news/totals/ (last visited
June 17, 2012).
34. Rose and Mishler pose an analogous question with regard to elections, conclud-
ing that there is no linear relationship between elections that are procedurally flawed
(due to corruption or other problems) and lack of regime support. See generally Richard
Rose & William Mishler, How Do Electors Respond to an "Unfair" Election? The Experi-
ence of Russians, 25 PosT-SovIET AFF. 118 (2009).
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an obviously flawed institution? Are Russians motivated by material or
ideological concerns in deciding whether to bring their claims to the
courts? To what extent is their use of the courts driven by their prior expe-
rience with the courts and/or their ability to hire legal professionals to help
them navigate the courts? Exploring these questions will reveal the extent
to which the Russian antipathy for judicial institutions, which has ostensi-
bly been documented in countless public opinion polls, affects court use.
Making use of data from national surveys of Russian firms and indi-
viduals, I explore these questions. I draw on the 2005 Round of the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)-World Bank
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) and
the 2006 Round of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS).35
In both surveys, respondents were asked about their contact with the
courts. The question posed to firms asked about their use of either the
courts of general jurisdiction or the arbitrazh courts.36 Approximately
27% of the surveyed firms had been to one or the other court between
2002 and 2005. Individuals were asked about their involvement with the
courts of general jurisdiction. Approximately 13% of the respondents had
had contact with these courts between 2000 and 2005. These surveys are
not linked to the official caseload data. They simply document the inci-
dence of contact between the respondents and the courts and, conse-
quently, shed light on the motivations for going to court in Russia.
Part I begins with a discussion of the underlying data and explains the
construction of the dependent variable for each dataset. Part II investigates
the frequency with which key demographic populations within each set of
respondents had contact with the courts. After working through these con-
trol variables, Parts III-V turn to the three hypotheses respectively.
The analysis strongly suggests that material concerns, rather than ide-
ology, drive Russians' decision to use (or avoid) the courts: the deeply
intertwined rationales of need and capacity are a great deal more powerful
in explaining court use than are the litigants' attitudes about law and legal
institutions. This helps us understand why court use has been increasing
even though public opinion polls repeatedly confirm the lack of trust in
the courts.37 Russians continue to litigate because the need presents itself
and the cost of doing so is relatively low. Put more bluntly, a belief in the
legitimacy of the court is not a prerequisite to utilizing it. My analysis only
35. EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND ENTER-
PRISE PERFORMANCE SURVEY (BEEPS) (2005), available at http://www.ebrd.com/pages/
research/economics/data/beeps.shtml; UNIV. N.C., CAROLINA POPULATION CTR., RUSSIA
LONGITUDINAL MONITORING SURVEY - HIGHER SCHOOL OF EcONOMICS (2006), available at
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse/data. All statistical data cited herein
reflects my independent analysis of these data sets.
36. In Russia, the nature of the parties determines jurisdiction. As a rule, legal enti-
ties use the arbitrazh courts when suing other companies or the state. When individuals
are involved, whether in lawsuits against other individuals or against companies, the
courts of general jurisdiction hear cases. See generally M.I. KLEANDROV, STATUS SUD'I
(2000).
37. See Hendley, supra note 31, at 244.
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begins to scratch the surface of the link between legitimacy and willingness
to litigate. Much more work is needed. At the same time, these preliminary
results suggest that the assumption that a lack of legitimacy for the judici-
ary discourages court use, an assumption that drives much of law and
development policy-makers' decision making, is mistaken.
I. The Data: RLMS and BEEPS
The RLMS is a nationally representative, household-based panel sur-
vey of Russians that uses a stratified cluster sample.38 Since 1992, it has
been fielded on a regular basis through collaboration between the Institute
of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (working through ZAO
"Demoscope") and the Carolina Population Center at the University of
North Carolina, Chapel Hill.39 The RLMS includes a standard battery of
questions designed to uncover the living standards and health of Russians
as well as basic demographic questions, including age, sex, marital status,
economic activity, educational level, and ethnicity.40 From time to time,
the RLMS includes modules of questions on other topics. I included a set
of questions pertaining to attitudes and behavior vis-a-vis the law in
Rounds 13 (2004) and 15 (2006) of the RLMS. 4' Round 15 incorporated a
series of questions on political participation and political attitudes that
proved useful. Though I occasionally draw on earlier Rounds to trace the
change in respondents' attitudes and well-being over time, my research is
centered on Round 15. This Round is most comparable in timing to the
2005 BEEPS data. The statistical analysis made use of the survey com-
mands in Stata 11, which are designed to take into account cluster sam-
pling in the sample design.
In contrast to the RLMS, which surveys individuals, BEEPS targets
firms. It has been carried out four times between 1998 and 2008 as a joint
project of the World Bank Group and the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development.42 BEEPS was fielded throughout Eastern Europe,
Turkey, and the former Soviet Union, including Russia. it uses a stratified
sample of firms, chosen on the basis of age, sector, size, and location. The
goal of the survey is to understand how firms are coping with the ongoing
38. See Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey - Higher School of Economics, U.N.C.,
CAROLINA POPULATION CENTER, http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse/project/sam-
pling (last visited Sept. 29, 2012) [hereinafter RLMS-HSE].
39. In 2010, the Higher School of Economics in Moscow became a collaborator on
the survey, resulting in a revised name for the project: RLMS-HSE. See id.
40. Id.
41. See ADULT QUESTIONNAIRE, ROUND 13, RUSSIA LONGITUDINAL MONITORING SURVEY
39J-40J (2004), available at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse/data/question-
naires/rmadult.pdf; QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ADULTS, ROUND 15, RusSIA LONGITUDINAL MONI-
TORING SURVEY 38-40 (2006), available at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rms-hse/
data/questionnaires/roadult.pdf.
42. For more information on BEEPS as well as access to the data, see Business Envi-
ronment and Enterprise Performance Survey, EUR. BANK RECONSTRUCTION & DEv., http://
www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/data/beeps.shtml (last visited Sept. 29,
2012); BEEPS DATA PORTAL, http://beeps.prognoz.com/beeps/Home.ashx (last visited
Sept. 29, 2012).
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transition to more democratic governments, to learn more about how firms
interact with the state in all its forms, and to track changes in the business
environment over time. Fortunately for my purposes, the legal system was
one aspect of the institutional environment on which the survey focused.
In all Rounds of BEEPS, firms were asked a battery of questions about their
attitudes toward law and the legal system. The survey also included basic
questions about the age, size, structure, sector, and location of the firm, as
well as basic performance indicators.
II. The Incidence of Contact with the Courts Among Russian
Individuals and Firms
The literature on Russian courts is voluminous.43 The popular media,
both in Russia and elsewhere, has catalogued the courts' flaws in excruci-
ating detail. Such stories are endemic to the Russian press, and the West-
ern press does not lag far behind. Beginning in May 2010 and continuing
through the end of 2010, The New York Times ran a series entitled "Above
the Law" exploring what its Moscow bureau chief, Clifford Levy, describes
as Russia's "culture of impunity."44 These articles provide a parade of hor-
ribles about the dysfunctional aspects of the Russian judicial system. The
series was awarded a Pulitzer Prize in 2011, confirming the widespread
acceptance of this view of the Russian courts. The more scholarly litera-
ture has documented the twists and turns of the efforts to reform the Rus-
sian courts over the past two decades. 45 This research has tended to be
more objective than the mass media's snapshot articles, but has devoted
more energy to the top-down story of institutional reform than to how Rus-
sian society has received these reforms.
The question of who actually uses the courts and why has been less
fully investigated, especially as to the courts of general jurisdiction.
Obtaining the data necessary to explore patterns of litigation has proven
difficult. As social scientists in Russia have turned their attention to legal
behavior, this has begun to change. In particular, the INDEM Foundation's
project on judicial reform has yielded some provocative results.46 With
funding from the World Bank, the Levada Center has fielded a national
representative survey, which explores these questions.47 Along similar
lines, that the American Bar Association organized to investigate the use of
43. See, e.g., supra note 12.
44. Above the Law, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/world/series/
abovethelaw/index.html?scp=1&sq=russia%20above%20the%201aw&st=cse (last vis-
ited Sept. 29, 2012).
45. See, e.g., SOLOMON & FOGLESONG, supra note 18; Jeffrey Kahn, Vladimir Putin and
the Rule of Law in Russia, 36 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 511, 514-20 (2008); Solomon, supra
note 12.
46. A.K. GORBUZ ET AL., TRANSFORMATSHA ROSS1SKOI SUDEBNOI VLASTI: OPYT KOMPLEK-
SNOGO ANALIZA (2010).
47. See generally L.D. GUDKOV, OTNOSHENIE PREDPRIIATIl K SUDEBNOI SISTEME: PERVAIA
VOLNA VYBOROCHNOGO OBSLEDOVANlA PREDPRIIATII/ORGANIZATSII (2010).
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the justice of the peace courts in several regions has great promise.4 3 To
date, however, the findings from these projects have limited themselves to
descriptive statistics that, while intriguing, represent only a first step.49 In
this Article, my goal is to take the next step.
Russian firms' use of law has been more fully studied. Beginning in
the 1990s, social scientists carried out large-scale surveys of enterprises in
an effort to document their evolution from state-owned entities to market
actors. A number of these surveys queried firms about their use of the
courts. For example, a 1997 survey in which I collaborated found that
almost 80% of the 328 firms surveyed had been parties in a case in the
arbitrazh courts in the preceding two years.5 0 Our finding confounded the
prevailing common wisdom that the arbitrazh courts were unusable due to
corruption, incompetence, and delays.5 1 Others have followed up on our
work and have likewise found use of the courts among Russian firms to be
surprisingly high.5 2 More recently, the World Bank-funded project queried
Russian firms about their strategies for resolving disputes and found that
65% of the respondent firms had used the arbitrazh courts.5 3 In prior
articles, I have explored the reasons for this phenomenon using insights
from case studies and courthouse interviews.5 4 In this Article, I tackle the
question using survey data following up on hypotheses generated from my
earlier research.
As to the willingness of ordinary Russian citizens to become involved
with the courts, my analysis concentrates on a question posed in both
Round 13 and Round 15 of the RLMS. Respondents were asked about their
contact with the courts over the preceding five years.5 5 The question was
designed to capture any sort of involvement with the courts, whether as a
party, juror, or witness. Respondents were given three options: 1) whether
they had had personal contact with the courts, 2) whether their friends or
family had had some involvement with the courts, or 3) whether they and
those close to them had had no contact whatsoever with the courts. As
Table 1 shows, the results for Round 13 and Round 15 were remarkably
48. See generally S. KRIUCHKOV & M. U. SHYEVIAKOV, OTNOSHENIE GRAZHDAN K
DEIATEL'NOS TI MIROVYH SUDov (2010).
49. See supra notes 46-48.
50. See Kathryn Hendley et al., Agents of Change or Unchanging Agents? The Role of
Lawyers Within Russian Industrial Enterprises, 26 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 685, 688, 707
(2001).
51. Hay & Shleifer, supra note 11, at 401.
52. See Simon Johnson et al., Courts and Relational Contracts, 18 J.L. EcoN. & ORG.
221, 226 (2002).
53. L.D. GUDKOV, OTNOSHENIE Ross1AN K SUDEBNOI SISTEME: PERVAIA VOLNA VSEROS5llS-
KOGO REPREZENTATIVNOGO OPROSA NASELENI1A (2010).
54. Hendley, supra note 8, at 38-39; Hendley, supra note 4, at 305.
55. The text of the question in Russian was as follows: "4Horna upiuxoaHioch
HMeTb AenO C CyaaM, HeBa)KHO B KRKOM KaIeCTBe: HCTIu8 HiH IOACyaHfM00, CBH tHTOISI
HJ1H HapO2JHOFO 3aceflaTes1, npaC5DKHOrO 3acenarensi a npocTo 3piaTens.
flpRxoAHnIocb A B TeeHie IISTb laeT HMOTh Aeno c cynau . .. ?"
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similar.56 In both rounds, about 12%-13% of the respondents had had
some sort of involvement with the courts. For Round 13, the sample size
was 10,527. In Round 15, it increased to 12,216.57
The dependent variable for the RLMS analysis was drawn from the
results for Round 15. Its timing was more closely comparable to that of
BEEPS. Given that I am interested in understanding why Russians are will-
ing to resort to a flawed institution, my focus is on those who have had
personal contact with the courts. In constructing the dependent variable, I
therefore included those who self-identified as having been involved with
the courts themselves. To be sure I had found all those who fit into this
category, I compared the results to those for a question about use of the
courts posed as part of a set of questions about the use of state institutions
more generally. Though the results of the two questions were almost iden-
tical, this second question identified a few additional court users. My
dependent variable for the analysis within the RLMS brought together those
identified as having had personal contact with the courts and those who
said they had used the courts. The breadth of the question is helpful in that
it draws in all respondents who have had any sort of experience with the
courts. On the other hand, its indiscriminateness limits my ability to dis-
tinguish between the types of experiences. It is reasonable that those who
have been defendants in criminal cases might nurse grudges that are
absent among those who were plaintiffs in a civil action. In this Article, my
goal is an overview of attitudes and behaviors of Russians toward their
courts and to generate hypotheses that can be tested with more detailed
data sets.
As to Russian firms' use of the courts, my analysis centers on a ques-
tion from BEEPS that asked whether the respondent firm had been to the
courts of general jurisdiction or to the arbitrazh courts as a plaintiff or
defendant in the preceding three years. This question was not included in
the first round in 1999-2000, but has been posed in each of the three
subsequent rounds carried out in Russia since 2002.58 In 2002, 28.2% of
the 489 firms surveyed had used the courts. In 2005, the incidence of use
decreased slightly to 26.8% of the 585 firms surveyed.' 9 By 2008, it had
increased to 42.2% of the 1,004 firms surveyed. The number of firms
56. The most significant difference is in the category of those whose friends and
family had been involved with the courts. An analysis of this change is beyond the scope
of the Article.
57. I excluded those who were unwilling to respond to the question or who found
the question too difficult to respond to. In both rounds, this was less than 3% of the
total sample.
58. Compare EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., BUSINEsS ENVIRONMENT
AND ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 10 (2002), available at http://www.
ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/beeps02q.pdf with EUROPEAN BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT SURVEY MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE-PRIVATE
SECTOR (1999), available at http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/beep
sq99.pdf.
59. The total number of firms that participated in 2005 was 601. Of these, 16 failed
to respond to the questions about court use. These firms have been excluded from my
analysis.
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included in the sample has changed and increased over the years, which
may explain some of the variation. Though the organizers of the BEEPS
project endeavor to create a panel, at present there are only a handful of
firms that have participated in multiple rounds of the survey, complicating
the task of explaining the variations over time.
In order to have some basic comparability with the RLMS results, my
analysis is limited to the 2005 round of BEEPS. The question about court
use is more straightforward in the BEEPS questionnaire than is the ques-
tion in the RLMS questionnaire. In the 2005 round, firms were asked to
provide two pieces of information about their use of the courts. First, they
were asked to indicate the number of times they went to court as a plaintiff.
Then, they were prompted for the number of times they went to court as a
defendant. Though it would have been possible to explore the behavior of
firms as plaintiffs and defendants separately, I constructed my dependent
variable for the firms by creating a dummy variable for all those who had
been to court in either capacity. This allows basic comparability to the
dependent variable for the RLMS data set. Ancillary analysis demonstrates
that the basic trends are the same for these two subgroups, perhaps
because there is significant overlap between them.60
A. Basic Traits of Russian Individuals Who Have Had Contact with the
Courts
Because we know so little about the profile of Russians who have con-
tact with the courts, I began my analysis by looking at basic demographic
traits, including gender, marital status, age, income, location, education,
ethnicity, and employment status. Table 2 lays out the descriptive statis-
tics. Model 1, set forth in Table 3, investigates their explanatory power by
laying out the results of a logistic regression. Many of these variables will
be explored in greater detail below as I work through the substantive
hypotheses. A brief overview of the findings will help set the stage.
Ethnicity is not a strong predictor of the use of courts. The RLMS
sample included representation from over forty different ethnic groups.
Given that 80% of the sample self-identified as Russian, 61 I divided the
sample into Russians and non-Russians and found that Russians were no
more or less inclined to be involved with the courts than were non-
Russians.
Income is likewise not significant,62 but having a job does matter.
60. Almost two-thirds of the firms who had been sued had also initiated lawsuits.
Of the firms who had been plaintiffs, about half also reported having been defendants.
61. No other ethnic group made up more than 5% of the surveyed population.
62. Due to the difficulties of capturing income levels of respondents, I used owner-
ship of big-ticket consumer goods as a proxy for social class or income. I adopted the
method that Bollen, Glanville, and Stecklov pioneered by constructing a scale based on
ownership of televisions, computers, video-cassette recorders, refrigerators, and cars. I
then added one to the number of items owned and took the natural log of the score. See
Kenneth A. Bollen et al., Economic Status Proxies in Studies of Fertility in Developing Coun-
tries: Does the Measure Matter?, 56 POPULATION STUD. 81, 85-86 (2002). Barrett and
Buckley previously used this method to good effect when analyzing RLMS data. See
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Table 1 suggests that those with steady incomes are more likely to have had
contact with the courts. As I add more explanatory variables to the regres-
sion, the significance of this variable wanes, indicating that its initial signif-
icance may be overstated. I will return to the role of economic well being
in the discussion of whether need drives the use of courts.
The other demographic variables-age, marital status, education, loca-
tion-appear to be important ingredients in explaining who has contact
with the courts in Russia. For the most part, the effects are not surprising.
For example, those with more education emerge as more likely to have been
to court in some capacity. This makes sense. Individuals' education
would make them more aware of the value of mobilizing their rights and
the societal importance of stepping forward as a witness or juror, if neces-
sary. As the analysis proceeds and variables that are aimed at testing my
substantive hypotheses are added, the significance of education as a pre-
dictor recedes. Along similar lines, the odds of having had contact with
courts are greater for urban residents, who have greater access to courts,
than for their country cousins. Again the significance of this variable dissi-
pates when the non-demographic variables are added.
By contrast, marital status has a more robust relationship with court
contact. The role of the courts in the divorce process helps explain why
those who have never been divorced were less likely to end up in court.
Though couples who have no children and no disagreement over the divi-
sion of property can dissolve their marriages in the same registry offices
where they were married, couples who do not fall into this category must
go through the courts to obtain divorces.63
Explaining the effect of gender is more difficult. Table 2 shows that
men are slightly more likely to have been involved with the courts. The
regression analysis documents that when controls for other socio-demo-
graphic effects and key independent variables are included, gender is
revealed as having a modest, but highly significant, effect.64 This is likely
driven by the large sample size.
Table 2 documents that the oldest and youngest Russians are the least
likely to be involved with the courts. Table 3 confirms this finding. The
robustness of these generational variables stands up in Models 1, 2, and 3.
The oldest age cohort is used as the reference group in the regression. It
shows that the odds of having had contact with the courts are much greater
for middle-aged Russians than for their parents or children. My earlier
work with focus groups had suggested that pensioners might be frequent
Jennifer B. Barrett & Cynthia Buckley, Gender and Perceived Control in the Russian Feder-
ation, 61 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 29, 36-37 (2009).
63. See SEMEINYI KODEKS Rossusxoi FEDERATS11, [SK RF [Family Code] art. 21 (Russ.).
For an overview of the evolution of divorce practices, see generally Maria V. Antokol-
skaia, The New Aspects of Russian Family Law, 31 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 23 (2001).
64. Initially I hypothesized that the significance of gender was driven by the interac-
tion between this variable and others. However, further analysis showed that there were
no significant interaction effects.
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litigators,6 5 but the survey data do not bear that out. Age is, of course, a
part of any explanation grounded in the need to use the courts and/or the
capacity to do so.
The low pseudo-r2 value for Model 1 indicates that these demographic
traits are not the key to explaining court contact. They account for only
about 4% of the outcome.
B. Basic Traits of Russian Firms that Have Used the Courts
As with individuals, I began my analysis of firms' use of courts by
looking at the extent to which their basic characteristics explained their
behavior. My earlier work had suggested that larger firms that were
founded during the Soviet period tended to be more active litigants. 66 The
reasons are practical. Due to their size, they engage in more transactions
than smaller firms, which means that the chances of having a dysfunc-
tional transaction increase. 6 7 The institutional legacy is also relevant. As a
matter of course, these firms would have had internal legal departments
(iuridicheskii otdel' or iur-otdel'). Notwithstanding the general consensus
among observers that these iur-otdel' were of peripheral importance during
the Soviet era,68 the tendency toward institutional inertia meant that they
were likely to survive privatization. Although the centrality of their role in
post-Soviet firms is debatable, my prior work suggests that firms with legal
departments are more likely to pursue their claims in court.6 9 Because
BEEPS did not include any questions about the legal expertise that the
respondent firms relied upon, I cannot test this specific hypothesis. How-
ever, the role of size and age are apparent from Table 4. Smaller firms are
less likely to go to court, as are newly formed firms. I will return to the
reasons why in the discussion of the capacity hypothesis below.
Table 4 documents that state-owned firms go to court more often than
do private firms. This variable is highly correlated with age and any signifi-
cance dissipates when the two variables are included in the same
regression.
The industry-based story is much the same. I divided the surveyed
firms into three groups: construction, manufacturing/mining, and ser-
vices. The descriptive statistics show that construction firms are the most
likely to have been to court and that firms in the service sector are the least
likely to have gone to court. Manufacturing and mining firms fall some-
where in-between. Making sense of the reasons why would require a more
65. Kathryn Hendley, Mobilizing Law in Contemporary Russia: The Evolution of Dis-
putes Over Home Repair Projects, 58 AM. J. Comp. L. 631, 669 (2010).
66. See Hendley et al., supra note 50, at 706-07, tbl.5.
67. For the entire sample, about 44% of firms had experienced non-payments
problems. The incidence was lower (39%) among small firms, and higher among
medium (56%) and large (57%) firms. The results were statistically significant at the
p<0.001 level.
68. See generally LOUISE 1. SHELLEY, LAWYERS IN SOVIET WORK LIFE (1984).
69. See Kathryn Hendley, The Role of In-House Counsel in Post-Soviet Russia in the
Wake of Privatization, 17 INT'LJ. LEGAL PROF. 5 (2010); Hendley et al., supra note 50, at
685, 688, 707.
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nuanced, industry-based analysis than is possible for this Article. When
put into a regression, the sign is as would be predicted based on the
descriptive statistics, but the marginal significance present in the bivariate
analyses disappears when other firm traits are added.
The results for firm location are surprising. I had expected Moscow
firms to be the most litigious because Moscow firms have a reputation as
being more sophisticated. 7 0 The Moscow arbitrazh courts enjoy a reputa-
tion of being highly capable that is well deserved according to my observa-
tional research. I reasoned that this competence might encourage local
firms to turn to these courts. Indeed, when firms include forum clauses in
their form contracts, these are the courts that are most often chosen.71 Yet
Table 4 reveals that Moscow firms are actually the least litigious. The
strength of these basic firm features is tested in a logistic regression (Model
4 in Table 5), which confirms this odd result. The composition of the sam-
ple drives the explanation for this finding. Upon closer examination, it
turns out that the Moscow firms included were skewed toward privately
owned firms that had been founded in the past decade. 72 As I have already
outlined, these characteristics are disproportionately associated with court
avoidance.73 Therefore, whether Moscow firms, on the whole, are more or
less litigious cannot fairly be determined through examining this sample.
Indeed, the skewed nature of the sample led me to discard location as a
control as I worked through the substantive hypotheses in Models 6 and 7
(Table 5).74 As with the analysis of individuals, the power of these basic
features as an explanation for firms' use of courts is relatively weak, as the
pseudo-r2 value of 0.1072 reveals.
III. Hypothesis One: Russian Citizens and Firms Resort to the Courts
When Necessary
Logic dictates that need is an important component in explaining why
people use courts. Few relish the prospect of going to court. As a rule, it is
expensive, time-consuming, and emotionally draining.75 Whenever possi-
ble, efforts are made to resolve problems without resorting to the courts.
Sometimes the specter of litigation can prompt mutually satisfactory settle-
70. See Kathryn Hendley, Effectiveness of Legal Institutions in the Transition Economy
in Post-Soviet Russia, in GovERNANCE, DECENTRALIZATION AND REFORM IN CHINA, INDIA AND
RussiA 419, 425 (Jean-Jacques Dethier ed., 2000).
71. See id. at 425-26.
72. Though about 30% of the firms in the sample were founded after 1999, over
40% of the Moscow firms fell into this category. The oversampling for private firms was
less extreme. While 10.3% of the firms surveyed were state-owned, only 7.6% of Mos-
cow firms were state-owned.
73. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
74. For more information on the challenges that the organizers of BEEPS faced in
recruiting firms, see Russia Enterprise Surveys Data Set Implementation Note 2009, avail-
able at https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Portal/elibrary.aspx?libid=14 (last visited
Mar. 12, 2011).
75. See, e.g., Hendley, supra note 65, at 655 (illustrating the emotional drain of going
to court).
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ments. Yet certain circumstances make going to court unavoidable. As
previously discussed, most couples getting divorced in Russia have to go to
court. Likewise, those involved in criminal proceedings typically find
themselves in court. The dynamics for firms are analogous. For the most
part, going to court is a voluntary choice. Firms can choose whether to
pursue a recalcitrant customer in court or find another route to settlement.
Like individuals, however, Russian firms can sometimes end up in court
against their will, as with bankruptcy and defense in actions brought
against them by another firm, a shareholder, or the state.
Testing my hypothesis that need drives the use of Russian courts is
complicated by the reality that not all problems that are capable of being
solved through litigation are taken to court. Indeed, no court system could
possibly handle the deluge of cases that would greet them if individuals
and firms turned over all justiciable problems to judges. Going to court is
almost always a last resort. There is a filtering system at play that, through
formal and informal incentives, discourages certain cases and diverts
others to alternative methods of dispute resolution.76 Social scientists of
varying stripes have devoted considerable energy to explaining the reasons
why those who have a pressing claim go to court, resolve their claim
outside the courts (either through legal or extra-legal methods), or decide
not to pursue their claim.71 For my purposes, the point here is that, while
few parties without compelling claims end up in court, many who have
unresolved compelling claims never go to court.
The Foundation for Public Opinion fielded national surveys in 2004
and 2008 that asked Russians whether they would go to court if faced with
a "conflictual situation."78 Need would logically be present in such cir-
cumstances. The percentage of those surveyed who were prepared to pur-
sue a claim to court fell from 39% to 34% over this period, but so too did
the number who felt that going to court was not a viable option for resolv-
ing their issues.79 In 2004, 44% took this position, while only 39%
expressed this position four years later.80 As this suggests, the percentage
of the surveyed population who took the position that this question was
too difficult to answer increased dramatically (from 17% to 27%).81
The INDEM Foundation survey on Russian courts took a more
76. See generally Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion
and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994); Felstiner et al., supra note 7,
at 636.
77. See generally, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); GENN, supra note 1; ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS
(2002); PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAw: STORIES FROM
EVERYDAY LIFE (1998); TYLER, supra note 10; William L.F. Felstiner, Avoidance as Dispute
Processing: An Elaboration, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 695 (1975).
78. Sudy i sud'i, Fom (Oct. 14, 2004), http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/dominant/domi-
nant2004/domO441/dd044114; Otnoshenie h sudebnoi sisteme, Fom (June 12, 2008),
http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/pow-jus/d082322.
79. See supra note 78.
80. See id.
81. See id.
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nuanced approach.82 Respondents were presented with four hypothetical
situations and asked whether they would be prepared to go to court. The
results show a greater willingness to contemplate litigation than is usually
assumed.83 In particular, it suggests that Russians are not cowed by the
prospect of taking on the state. For example, when asked how they would
respond to a decree of the Russian government that infringed upon their
housing rights, 44% were open to pursuing the matter in court.8 4 Along
similar lines, 40% indicated that they would be prepared to go to court if
the legislature passed a law that authorized setting a lower temperature in
residential buildings during winter.85 Yet when asked what they would do
if they were unfairly punished at work, only 20% said they would go to
court.86 Further analysis indicates that respondents would prefer to either
resolve this latter type of dispute informally (making use of connections or
finding a compromise) or endure it passively.8 7
A. Need as an Explanation for Why Russian Individuals Interact with
the Courts
The reasons why individuals might need to go to the courts are almost
infinite. The questions included as a standard part of the RLMS question-
naires allow us to explore two of these, namely whether family dysfunction
or economic difficulties predict contact with the courts.
As noted above, couples divorcing in Russia must go to court if they
have children or if they cannot agree on the division of their property."8
This makes divorce a natural area to investigate. Respondents were asked
about their current marital status. They were given six options: never mar-
ried, in a registered marriage, living together and not registered, widowed,
divorced and not remarried, and separated.89 The disadvantage of relying
on this question is that it is limited to a snapshot of the marital status of
respondents in 2005. Many of those who were then married or living
together may have had prior divorces. In order to capture the full popula-
tion of respondents who had been through a divorce, I took advantage of
the panel nature of the data. I constructed a variable that captured every-
one who had been divorced over the course of the survey. While 8.2%
described themselves as divorced as part of the Round 15 survey, looking
back at the earlier Rounds revealed an additional 6.5% who had gone
through a divorce. As Model 1 indicates, marital strife is a strong predictor
of court contact. The odds of court contact are about 80% higher for those
having experienced divorce than for others. The strong significance of
82. GORBUZ ET AL., supra note 46, at 368.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 369.
88. Id.
89. The distribution of respondents among these categories was as follows: Never
married (21%); in a registered marriage (48.5%); cohabitating (9.9%); widowed
(11.6%); divorced (8.2%); and separated (0.8%).
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these results stands up as I add other possible explanatory variables, testi-
fying to the role of legal requirements as part of the explanation for contact
with the courts.
Individuals and families who are experiencing economic difficulties
may find themselves in court more often than those who are not. More
specifically, they may not be able to pay their bills regularly, whether taxes,
rent, utilities, or installment payments due on consumer goods. As this
suggests, their contact with the courts may have been involuntary. 90 Two
of the basic demographic indicators referenced earlier are worth returning
to. Being unemployed and being poorly paid are both indicative of eco-
nomic hard times. Being in the bottom income quartile has no predictive
power. Employment status is trickier to interpret. The descriptive statis-
tics reported in Table 2 suggest that people without jobs are less likely to
have had contact with the courts. This goes against my reasoning that
those experiencing hard times may be the target of lawsuits. On the other
hand, it stands to reason that having a steady income would be helpful if
one were the instigator of the litigation. In any event, the regression analy-
sis indicates that this variable has limited predictive value.
In addition to these objective measures of respondents' economic well-
being, I also explored the effect of their perceptions of their situation. The
panel nature of the RLMS allowed me to compare how these perceptions
changed over time and whether these changes are related to contact with
the courts. In many rounds of the RLMS, respondents were asked a series
of questions that required them to place themselves on a "ladder" of well-
being. One of these focused on wealth. I compared respondents' answers
between Rounds 11 (2002) and 15 (2006). Interestingly, those who felt
poorer were no more likely to have been to court than those whose situa-
tions had remained stable or had improved. This variable therefore turned
out to be a bad predictor of court use. Round 15 also included a question
in which respondents were asked to compare their families' current finan-
cial situations with their situations a year earlier. They were asked to peg
their responses along a five-point scale, ranging from much worse to much
better. I created a dummy variable that isolated those who viewed their
financial positions as worse or much worse than it had been a year before.
As Table 6, which contains descriptive statistics for the non-demographic
variables used in the regression analysis, indicates, this group made up
16% of the sample. The regression analysis shows that misfortune is a
strong predictor of court use, with the odds for having had court contact
being substantially greater for this group than for those whose financial
situations had remained stable or had improved over the past year. Taken
together with the result for the comparison of the ladder variables, this
suggests that short-term reversals are more potent as a predictor of court
use than is a longer-term, downward spiral.
90. Because the question about court use was framed in general terms, I cannot
segregate those who were defendants from those who were plaintiffs or jurors.
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B. Need as an Explanation for Why Russian Firms Resort to the Courts
As with individuals, firms go to court for a myriad of reasons. Studies
of U.S. firms have shown that litigation is generally a last resort. The cost,
measured in both time and money, discourages firm management from
pursuing claims to the courts.9 ' Additionally, the confrontational nature
of the adversarial process means that few trading relationships survive a
lawsuit, creating yet another disincentive for litigation.9 2
The situation is different for Russian firms. Most of their litigation is
with other firms in the arbitrazh courts. The procedural rules governing
these courts provide few advantages for skilled oral advocates. Rather, the
process focuses on the documents that form the transaction at issue.93
Few firms hire outside counsel to represent them in court, thereby elimi-
nating much of the expense of litigating. 94 To this end, when asked about
the cost of going to court, almost two-thirds of the firms surveyed in BEEPS
replied that this was not a frequent obstacle for them. As to delays, the
procedural code lays out clear timetables for the various types of cases.95
The ability of judges to meet these deadlines largely determines their sala-
ries and eligibility for promotion.96 The official caseload data for 2010
indicate that less than 7% of cases take longer than statutorily pre-
scribed. 97 Not surprisingly, the speed of the judicial process was not a
serious concern for the firms surveyed as part of BEEPS. Less than 10%
found it to be a persistent obstacle. Even more interesting is the lower rela-
tional cost for Russian businesses of going to court. Because the process is
not confrontational, it does not necessarily lead to ruptures. In a study of
the enforcement of arbitrazh court judgments, the participating firms
clearly indicated that they were willing to continue working together after
litigation.98
The lower costs, measured in terms of financial outlays, time lost, and
damage to relationships, result in a greater willingness to use the courts.
Indeed, during the chaotic years of the 1990s, many firms used the arbi-
trazh courts as a debt collection agency, bringing claims for which the out-
91. Heise, supra note 3, at 814-16; Priest & Klein, supra note 2, at 6; Silver, supra
note 2, at 2073-74.
92. See Ross E. Cheit & Jacob E. Gersen, When Businesses Sue Each Other: An Empiri-
cal Study of State Court Litigation, 25 LAw & Soc. INQuIRY 789, 792-93 (2000); Lane
Kenworthy et al., "The More Things Change . . .": Business Litigation and Governance in
the American Automobile Industry, 21 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 631, 651 (1996); Macaulay,
supra note 4, at 61.
93. Hendley, supra note 4, at 310.
94. Id. at 328.
95. Id. at 329.
96. Kathryn Hendley, Handling Economic Disputes in Russia: The Impact of the 2002
Arbitrazh Procedure Code 5 (Nat'1 Council for Eurasian & E. European Research), availa-
ble at http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/2005-819-08g-Hendley.pdf.
97. Over the past five years, the percent of cases not heard within the statutorily
prescribed deadlines has ranged from a low of 5.1% in 2006 to 7.4% in 2008. Tablitsa
osnovnykh pokazatelei raboty arbitrazhnykh sudov Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2006-2010, avail-
able at http://www.arbitr.ru/_upimg/1CAE82600C78C54F27FA3828Fl6E5E00_4.pdf.
98. See Hendley, supra note 4, at 315.
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come was never in doubt for the sole purpose of receiving a court order
entitling them to repayment of the overdue debt.99 The problem of inter-
enterprise arrears has receded in recent years, but the habit of turning to
the court may have persisted.100
Seeking help with non-payments is an excellent illustration of a need-
based motivation for using the courts. The firms that BEEPS surveyed
were asked whether they had had to resolve any overdue payments in the
preceding thirty-six months. As Table 7, which contains descriptive statis-
tics for the non-demographic variables from BEEPS used in the regression
analysis, indicates, 44% responded positively. Such firms were much more
likely to have been to court. Almost half of this group (48.7%) had done
so, in contrast to the less than 20% of the firms who had not had payment
problems with their customers. Model 5, shown in Table 5, confirms that
the existence of overdue payments is the single most important predictor of
court use for Russian firms, providing confirmation of the need-driven
hypothesis.
Given that the surveyed firms reported that customers' failure to pay
their bills on time constituted a serious problem for them, it stands to rea-
son that a significant portion of them were also guilty of the same lapse.
The firms were asked whether they currently owed money for taxes, utili-
ties, wages, or material inputs. Because this question simply took a snap-
shot, rather than asking for their experiences over a sustained period, the
number of firms affected should be lower, and it is. Table 7 shows that
slightly less than 10% of the surveyed firms admitted to being debtors
themselves. The fact that the vast majority of these firms (84%) had also
experienced difficulty with getting paid by their suppliers stands to reason.
Nor is it surprising that these firms were more likely to have gone to court.
Initially, I thought they would be natural defendants. To be sure, they were
sued more frequently than their more financially secure counterparts. But
they also emerge as more likely to instigate lawsuits themselves. The
descriptive statistics show that debtor firms were twice as likely as other
firms to have been a plaintiff rather than a defendant. Desperation can be
a powerful motivator. The regression analysis corroborates the power of
debtor status as a predictor of court use.
Following up on the role of desperation in litigation, I explored pay-
ment methods. In a series of case studies carried out in early 1998, 1
found that firms that operated on a cash basis were less prone to go to
court because they simply refused to provide services if they were not
99. Id. at 336.
100. During my interviews with arbitrazh judges in Moscow, Ekaterinburg, Voronezb,
and St. Petersburg during the 2011-12 academic year, they consistently told me that the
economic crisis of 2008 had contributed to an increase in debt collection cases. The
statistical data provide support for their claim. The number of cases involving two busi-
nesses (as opposed to cases involving the state or bankruptcy cases) increased by 76%.
That trend continued through 2010. Though the number of cases dropped off slightly
for 2011, it has not returned to pre-crisis levels. Tablitsa osnovnyh pokazatelei raboty
arbitrazhnyh sudov Rossiishoi Federatsii v 2007-2011, available at http://www.arbitr.ru/
press-centr/news/totals/index ar.htm.
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paid. 01 This was a period when barter was prevalent and the banking
system was largely dysfunctional.102 Fortunately for the respondent firms,
times have changed. Over 90% of the sample engaged in no in-kind
exchanges. About two-thirds of the firms occasionally pay their suppliers
with cash, but the majority do so less than 20% of the time. Though there
remain a subset of firms that always use cash (23.9% of the sample), these
firms are not significantly more likely to go to court. Indeed, the regres-
sion analysis indicates just the opposite. Using firms that eschew cash as
the reference group, the odds of going to court are greater for firms that
embrace credit. Somewhat unexpectedly, firms that rely on a mixture of
cash and credit emerge as the group with the greatest odds of litigating.
Their odds of having been to court are twice those of firms who stick with
cash. Although firms that never use cash have an odds ratio greater than
one, indicating that they are in court more than firms who rely solely on
cash, the relationship is not significant. In contrast to the situation in the
late 1990s, cash now seems to be a marker for sector and size. Firms in the
service sector tend to rely more on cash, as do smaller firms.
This earlier work also generated a hypothesis about the relationship
between competition and propensity to litigate. My case studies indicated
that firms that had robust competition were less likely to sue their custom-
ers, even if they were slow in paying, out of fear that they would turn to
another supplier for the goods. 103 Put differently, in my 1998 study, firms
that had a fungible customer base were the most aggressive in their debt
collection and did not shy away from taking their customers to court. The
BEEPS data suggest that this may have been an artifact of the unusual con-
ditions of the 1990s. The level of competitiveness (measured by the num-
ber of competitors in the local market) had no effect on the odds of having
gone to court.104 Need is clearly an important part of the explanation of
why Russian firms use the courts. The increase in the pseudo-r2 value as
between Models 5 and 6 tells the story. It shot up to 0.2441, vividly dem-
onstrating the impact of adding these need-driven variables.
IV. Hypothesis Two: Russian Citizens' and Firms' Interactions with
the Courts is Linked to Their Capacity.
Like need, capacity is a quality that is usually a prerequisite for use of
the courts, but its presence does not always translate into use. Capacity
refers to any sort of preexisting knowledge of, or experience with, state
institutions that would give the user a greater comfort level with the courts.
It need not be located within the individual or firm. As socio-legal scholars
101. See Hendley, supra note 8, at 20-55.
102. See JULIET JOHNSON, A FISTFUL OF RUBLES: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE RUSSIAN BANK-
ING SYSTEM (2000).
103. See Hendley, supra note 8, at 20-55.
104. The survey asked separately about competitors in the local and national mar-
kets. Only about a quarter of the firms characterized themselves as national firms.
Hence I used the question about local market conditions to test the role of
competitiveness.
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have argued, those without personal experience can gain capacity by affili-
ating themselves with others who have it.105 Typically this involves hiring
lawyers, but the same effect can come through a connection with a busi-
ness association or non-governmental organization that has a proven track
record in dealing with the problem at hand. Michelson's work on disput-
ing patterns in China reminds us of the importance of political connec-
tions in facilitating the use of state institutions. 106 Such connections are
also relevant to Russians as they decide whether or not to make use of the
courts.107
Procedural rules govern the use of courts. The complexity of these
rules varies. Simpler rules facilitate ordinary citizens or firms having
greater direct access to the courts. As rules grow increasingly complex,
litigants become less capable of fully understanding them. They may
become discouraged and adopt court-avoidance strategies.' 0 8 In countries
in which the courts are overloaded, making the procedural rules technical
can be a strategy for limiting the use of the courts to those with non-frivo-
lous claims.10 9 When encountering dense rules, litigants tend to rely more
on lawyers and other legal professionals.1 0 In such circumstances, those
who are unable to work through these intermediaries can be disadvantaged
in judicial proceedings. Though trials are idealized as a search for the
truth, in reality a facility with procedural rules allows parties to present
their evidence to maximum advantage."' A variety of factors can cause
the inability to gain representation, including a lack of resources to pay for
this expertise, a dearth of legal professionals, or a lack of appreciation on
the part of a neophyte litigant for the importance of being represented.
How much of an advantage the mastery of procedural rules provides
to Russian litigants is unclear. During the Soviet period, the procedural
codes were fairly straightforward.11 2 Judges tended to err on the side of
accepting complaints and admitting evidence, even if litigants had failed to
fully observe the procedural rules. Judges would often help inexperienced
105. See Felstiner et al., supra note 7, at 636; Galanter, supra note 2, at 146.
106. Ethan Michelson, Climbing the Dispute Pagoda: Grievances and Appeals to the
Official Justice System in Rural China, 72 Am. Soc. REV. 459, 464-65 (2007).
107. There is a large literature on the critical role that connections (sviazy) played in
the Soviet period and their continuing influence in the post-Soviet era. See generally
JOSEPH S. BERLINER, FACTORY AND MANAGER IN THE USSR (1957); ALENA V. LEDENEVA, Rus-
SIA S ECONOMY OF FAvOuRs: BLAT, NETWORKING AND INFORMAL EXCHANGE (Stephen White
et al. eds., 1998); Simis, supra note 12. The role of connections in the legal arena raises
the specter of "telephone law," which is the practice of deciding cases based on phone
calls from the political elite rather than the written law. See generally Hendley, supra
note 31; Alena V. Ledeneva, Telephone Justice in Russia, 24 PosT-SoVIET AFF. 324 (2008).
A full discussion of the role of connections in Russian life is beyond the scope of this
Article.
108. See Felstiner et al., supra note 7, at 636.
109. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Kathryn Hendley, Assessing the Rule of Law in Russia, 14 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 347, 364 (2006).
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parties through the process." 3 Naturally, this made it easier for individu-
als to represent themselves in the courts of general jurisdiction. As a corol-
lary, it also had the effect of muting the need for legal expertise, especially
in non-criminal cases." 4 As the arbitrazh courts got on their feet in the
1990s, their procedural rules were fairly simple. The procedural code con-
templated dismissing cases when litigants showed up unprepared, but
judges rarely did so, preferring to resolve disputes on their merits rather
than dismissing them on technicalities." 5 They reasoned that most firms
were inexperienced in the legal arena and that it would be unfair to expect
overnight mastery of these procedural rules. This rationale became less
persuasive as the transition continued, but was still voiced by many
judges.116 Once again, this permissive attitude had the effect of diminish-
ing the effect of, and the need for, legal expertise.
Recent years have witnessed a wholesale rewriting of the Russian pro-
cedural codes. Without exception, they have become more complicated. In
part, this increased complexity represents an effort to enhance the effi-
ciency of the courts and to give judges additional tools to help them cope
with the deluge of cases. Whether judges in the courts of general jurisdic-
tion and the arbitrazh courts have availed themselves of these tools is
unclear. If the rules have been enforced strictly, then we would expect to
see greater use of lawyers. The limited evidence paints a mixed picture. In
the 2008 survey that INDEM conducted, Russian individuals and business-
men were asked whether court workers helped them prepare their com-
plaints. Of the individuals surveyed, 37.7% reported that they had received
help with their pleadings. By contrast, only 10% of businesses had
received help. Given that many businesses have in-house lawyers, they are
less likely to have requested help.
Having gone to court in the past may allay fears of the judicial process.
It may also enhance capacity in that it educates participants about the pro-
cess. Of course, it could have just the opposite effect. If their experiences
have been unsatisfying, then prior litigants may avoid the courts. The
INDEM survey explored this question in the Russian context. Its respon-
dents were divided into three categories: those who had been to court many
times, those who had been to court once, and those who had no prior
experience with the courts. Those who were most experienced were the
113. Berman and Feifer detail the educational function of Soviet judges. See BERMAN,
supra note 12; FEWER, supra note 30. Berman comments, "Soviet law treats the individ-
ual as a child or youth, as a dependent." BERMAN, supra note 12, at 380. Work on East
Germany shows that this was a standard feature of legal systems under state socialism.
Inga Markovits, Pursuing One's Rights Under Socialism, 38 STAN. L. REv. 689, 761 (1986).
114. Kaminskaya's memoir documents the critical role of advokaty in the criminal
process. See KAMINSKAYA, supra note 12. There is a large literature on advokaty in the
Soviet and post-Soviet eras that documents its critical role in the criminal process. See,
e.g., EUGENE HUSKEY, RussIAN LAWYERS AND THE SOVIET STATE: THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE SOVIET BAR, 1917-1939 (1986); PAMELA A. JORDAN, DEFENDING RIGHTS IN
RUSSIA: LAWYERS, THE STATE, AND LEGAL REFORM IN THE POsT-SOVIET ERA (2006).
115. See Kathryn Hendley, Are Russian Judges Still Soviet?, 23 PosT-SOVIET AFF. 240,
258-59 (2007); supra note 114.
116. Id.
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most prepared to go to court again, and those who had no experience were
the least prepared to litigate.11 7 This suggests that for Russians, much as
for Americans," 8 prior experience facilitates, rather than discourages,
contact with the courts.
A. Capacity as an Explanation for Why Russian Individuals Interact
with the Courts
There are two categories of variables that are worth exploring as to the
extent to which capacity explains Russians' contact with the court. The
first category includes variables that might be linked to a generalized abil-
ity or willingness to make use of state institutions, including courts. Once
again, this mandates a return to the basic demographic traits. Location,
age, and education are almost certainly related to capacity to use state
institutions. Whether they are robust predictors of contact with the courts
is less clear. Those with a history of using state institutions other than
courts may be more open to getting involved with the courts.
The second category of variables is more specifically tied to the capa-
bility to use courts. Access to lawyers or other types of legal assistance in
navigating the intricacies of the judicial system is likely to be helpful, given
that such professionals can make up for deficiencies in the abilities of
individuals.
Primary among the first category of explanatory variables is educa-
tion. The descriptive statistics tell us that those with university degrees are
more likely to have had contact with the courts. The effect is not as
profound as might have been expected. Those with advanced education
are surely better positioned to interpret both substantive and procedural
rules, but this advantage can be blunted by hiring lawyers. Model 1 indi-
cates some considerable predictive power, but the significance of education
fades as additional capacity-related variables are added. The odds ratio
hovers around 1 in Models 2 and 3, reflecting that its impact has been
muted by the other variables."19
Proximity to courts might also lead to contact. Population determines
the locations of courts of general jurisdiction. Though they are scattered
throughout Russia, respondents who live in more densely populated areas
would have had easier access to courts. Table 2 indicates that urban dwell-
117. INDEM's respondents were asked whether they were prepared to go to court.
Table 6.3.5 shows that 26.5% of those who had gone to court repeatedly said they would
do so if it was necessary. By contrast, 18.1% of those who had been to court once
responded positively. The percentage dropped to 10.1% for those who had never been
to court. The results as to whether they were unwilling to entertain the idea of going to
court are less stark, but the same dynamic is at work. Among those who were repeat
users, 8.5% were unwilling to try again, whereas 10.2% and 11.6% of the single users
and non-users, respectively, were unreceptive. See GoRBUZ ET AL., supra note 46, tbl.
6.3.5.
118. See Herbert M. Kritzer & John Voelker, Familiarity Breeds Respect: How Wisconsin
Citizens View Their Courts, 82 JUDICATURE 58 (1998).
119. As with gender, I suspected that this result might be due to an interaction effect,
but further analysis showed this to be untrue.
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ers are slightly more likely to have been to court than are those from rural
areas. When this dichotomous variable is put into the regression with
other demographic characteristics, it is significant. But a more detailed
analysis reveals that the odds of contact with the courts are much lower for
those who live in villages than for those who live in small towns, cities, or
regional capital cities. Village dwellers would have to travel further dis-
tances to get to a court. As with education, the significance of location
wanes when the model is expanded.
Age is a different story. Here the descriptive statistics and the regres-
sion analysis buttress one another. Table 2 clearly shows that older Rus-
sians (born before 1940) are less likely than middle-aged Russians (born
between 1940 and 1987) to have had contact with the courts. It also tells
us that teenage respondents are the least litigious group. I used the oldest
age cohort as the reference group for my regression analysis. It confirms
the predictive power of age, which persists even as I include additional vari-
ables. Indeed, the odds of court contact are almost two times greater for
those born between 1951 and 1977 as compared to those over 65. Only the
youngest age cohort (born after 1988) have odds that are lower than this
elderly set of respondents. The minimal contact of teenagers with courts
makes sense. Few would expect them to be active litigants, nor would they
be likely to be pressed into service as a witness or juror.
Explaining the other age cohorts' contact with the courts is more chal-
lenging. My prior interview-based research revealed the lack of free time as
one of the biggest obstacles to going to court. 120 Those in my oldest age
cohort would seem to have more time to pursue their claims to court or to
serve as jurors. They have long since passed the standard retirement age
(60 for men; 55 for women). Virtually all of them receive a pension.121
Though many Russian pensioners have been forced back into the job mar-
ket to make ends meet, less than 8% of this group admits to having a paid
job. The luxury of time arguably creates capacity for using the courts, but
may be yet another necessary but insufficient condition. My interview sub-
jects may have exaggerated the time commitment required. Or they may
have overstated the propensity of Russian judges to indulge parties who
seek to drag out cases by allowing multiple continuances. Perhaps the seri-
ousness of the claim trumps any scheduling problems. This takes us back
to need.122 Those in their 40s and 50s emerge as the most likely to have
had contact with the courts. This is certainly a time when people might
have problems in many areas of their lives.
Looking at non-demographic factors, it stands to reason that respon-
dents who feel disempowered might be less willing to use the courts and
vice versa. In addition to asking respondents to place themselves on a lad-
der of economic well-being, most rounds of the RLMS also asked them to
120. See Hendley, supra note 65, at 669.
121. Of the almost two thousand respondents in this category, only three do not
receive a pension.
122. Ideology might also be part of the explanation. I will return to age in the discus-
sion of the third hypothesis.
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place themselves on a spectrum of power. The question asked them to
imagine a nine-step ladder where people who are completely without rights
stand on the bottom rung and those who have a great deal of power stand
on the highest rung. I compared the results from Rounds 11 (2002) and 15
(2006). Using those who reported no change as a reference category, the
regression results show that the odds of contact with the courts are signifi-
cantly less for people who feel less powerful. As elsewhere, Russians who
believe their rights to be meaningless are more likely to "lump" their
claims. Going to court is probably not seen as a viable option for them.
Interestingly, the reverse is not true. Feelings of greater empowerment do
not lead to greater use of the courts as compared to those whose situations
remain unchanged. Perhaps those with greater power have alternatives
unavailable to the powerless, such as informal networks and a willingness
to exert their power over others to force settlements.
Respondents who have had contact with state institutions other than
courts may be more open to the courts. This willingness may reflect a
capacity to handle interactions with the state. In Russia, many people shy
away from any sort of involvement with the state, whether out of a distaste
for bureaucracy or because they fear the state. In Round 15 of the RLMS,
respondents were asked whether they had applied to certain state agencies,
including suppliers of municipal services, housing registration, passport
offices, the police, the courts, and the traffic police. Leaving aside the
courts (which is part of my dependent variable), I created dummy vari-
ables to isolate respondents who had repeatedly used state institutions.
Not surprisingly, these represented a minority of those surveyed. Less
than 12% have used two agencies, and less than 4% have used three agen-
cies. These variables proved to be potent predictors of contact with the
courts. Model 2 incorporates the variable that brings together those who
have used at least two agencies. The probability of having had contact with
the courts was almost 70% greater for this group. The odds ratio is even
higher (1.92) for those who have used three state agencies.
Lawyers provide an avenue to gaining an understanding of the intrica-
cies of the judicial process and building capacity for those who lack prior
experience or knowledge of the courts. In both Rounds 13 and 15, respon-
dents were asked whether they had consulted with a lawyer in the preced-
ing two years.12 3 I created a variable that isolated those who admitted to
having met with lawyers in either survey. This amounted to almost 20% of
the sample. While only 13.2% of those surveyed have had contact with the
courts, among those who had consulted with a lawyer, this percent
skyrocketed to 41.5%. The regression analysis substantiates this relation-
ship, indicating that the odds of having had contact with the courts is a
staggering eight times greater for those who have been to a lawyer. This
result is surprising only in its power. A lawyer's job is to ease the path to
123. Like many European countries, Russia's bar is divided between those who pri-
marily litigate (advokaty) and those who focus more on transactional work (iuristy). In
contrast to the United Kingdom, the dividing line between the two is rather porous in
Russia. In an effort to be inclusive, the question included both terms for lawyers.
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court for lay people. It is to be expected that many of those who consulted
with lawyers soldiered on to court. This reflects not only an enhanced
capacity but also an indication of the seriousness of the underlying claim.
Consulting a lawyer, like going to court, can be expensive.124 Few do so
without having a genuine problem that has resisted resolution through
informal means.
This discussion of factors related to capacity, along with the pseudo-r2
value of 0.191 for Model 2, might lead one to conclude that capacity is a
better predictor of Russians' contact with courts than mere need. There is
no question that several of the factors, including prior use of state institu-
tions and consulting with lawyers, are powerful predictors of contact. But
disentangling capacity from need with respect to these capacity-related fac-
tors is difficult. Moreover, the questions posed as part of the RLMS provide
more opportunity to test the hypothesis that contact with courts is driven
by capacity.
B. Capacity as an Explanation for Why Russian Firms Resort to the
Courts
Assessing the role of capacity in explaining Russian firms' use of the
courts requires us to return to the fundamental traits of these firms. Logi-
cally, location, age, and size ought to be part of the explanation. At first
glance, the size of firms seems to be a powerful predictor of receptivity to
courts. In Model 4, mid-sized and large firms emerge as more active liti-
gators than do small firms. As the variables more specifically related to my
substantive hypotheses are included, the strong significance persists for
medium firms with 50 to 249 employees. Their odds of having litigated are
twice that of small firms. Though the odds ratios for large firms with over
250 employees remain well above 1, indicating that these firms are more
likely to have been to court than small firms, the significance disappears
once variables related to need are included (such as debtor status and exis-
tence of non-payment problems with customers). Likewise the use of audi-
tors by firms initially seemed intriguing. These firms are consistently
more involved with the courts than are firms that eschew auditors. But
upon closer examination, the use of auditors turned out to be yet another
variable that was highly correlated with size, with larger firms being more
likely to use them.
The role of age is more complicated than is initially apparent from
Table 5. These results suggest that older firms are more likely to go to
court. While true, when the dependant variable is disaggregated between
plaintiffs and defendants, it turns out that Soviet-era firms are much more
likely to be defendants than plaintiffs, whereas firms created in the early
1990s are the most likely to be plaintiffs. Many firms founded during the
Soviet period struggled to find their way during the transition to the mar-
ket. These difficulties may have persisted and may explain why these older
124. Over half of those surveyed in Round 15 identified the high cost of lawyers'
services as an obstacle to bringing claims to court.
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firms are more likely to be defendants. When the dependent variable is
limited to participation in the judicial system as a defendant, the odds
ratios for Soviet-era firms are consistently greater than 2 for all of the
BEEPS models and remain highly significant (p<0.01). As I noted at the
outset, the founding date of a firm reveals a great deal about the likely
internal structure. Legal departments were a standard feature of firms cre-
ated during the Soviet period. Whether these Soviet-era firms retained
their legal departments is unknowable from the data. If they did, this
would provide an enhanced capacity to respond to lawsuits. Capacity
would be a more persuasive explanation if these older firms with estab-
lished internal legal departments were the most frequent instigators of liti-
gation. But they are not. While their odds of being plaintiffs are greater
than that of newly created firms, these results are not significant. Instead,
firms created between 1992 and 1995 emerge as the most energetic liti-
gators. When the analysis focuses solely on plaintiffs, this group is twice
as likely to have initiated lawsuits as compared with firms founded after
2000.125 For Models 4 and 5, these results are significant at the p>0.05
level, though it tapers off to the p>0.1 level for Model 6. Capacity-driven
explanations cannot help us understand why this particular set of firms is
the most litigious. Firms created during this period were not known for
insisting on internal legal departments. In fact, my prior research suggests
just the opposite.126
Through BEEPS, firms were queried about their membership in busi-
ness associations. About a quarter of the sampled firms were members.
Much like hiring lawyers, joining a business association is a way to
enhance capacity, not just in terms of the courts, but with regard to busi-
ness transactions more generally. Precisely what the effect would be was
unclear. On the one hand, members might litigate less due to the connec-
tions gained and the resulting ability to negotiate advantageous settle-
ments. On the other hand, members might gain insider knowledge about
the courts from more experienced colleagues and be more open to taking
their disputes to court. Model 5 indicates that the odds of having litigated
were greater for firms who had opted to join business associations than for
their unaffiliated brethren. Although the power of this variable as an expla-
nation for litigious behavior is marginal, when the behavior of plaintiffs
and defendants is analyzed separately the potent role of business associa-
tions comes into clearer focus. Among plaintiff firms, the chances of initi-
ating a lawsuit are two times greater for members of business associations
than for non-members.127 This suggests that members may be sharing
knowledge and experiences, whether formally or informally.
125. In a regression analysis where being a plaintiff is the dependent variable, the
odds ratios for Models 4, 5, and 6 are 1.934, 2.003, and 1.942, respectively.
126. Kathryn Hendley, The Role of In-House Counsel in Post-Soviet Russia in the Wake of
Privatization, 17 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 5 (2010); Hendley et al., supra note 50.
127. When Model 5 is run with the dependent variable limited to firms that have
gone to court as plaintiffs, the odds ratio for membership in a business association is
2.032 and is highly significant (p<0.01). As would be expected, the odds ratio decreases
slightly in Model 6 (1.848), as does the significance (p<0.05).
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Location is a more complicated story. The vagaries of sampling (espe-
cially in Moscow) undermined the usefulness of the size of the town where
the firm is located. In reality, however, the size of the town would simply
be a proxy for distance from a court. Unlike courts of general jurisdiction,
which are spread throughout the Russian Federation, there is only one
trial-level arbitrazh court for each region, which is located in the oblast
capital.' 28 I recoded the cities in which the survey was carried out to dis-
tinguish between locales with arbitrazh courts and those without such
courts. Arbitrazh courts can be found in twelve of the sixty cities included
in the survey. The firms from these twelve cities comprised about two-
thirds of the sample. I reasoned that being in close proximity to these
courts would enhance the odds of using them. The analysis did not bear
this out. Nearness to an arbitrazh court has no effect on court use. Of
course, the somewhat unrepresentative nature of the Moscow sample,
which makes up about 40% of the set of firms near arbitrazh courts, may
be affecting this result. But taking Moscow out of the analysis changed
nothing. This outcome may be a reflection of the procedural rules gov-
erning arbitrazh courts, which do not require litigants to argue their cases
in person. The document-centric nature of arbitrazh procedure may mute
the importance of showing up, which would naturally limit the signifi-
cance of being located near an arbitrazh court.
V. Hypothesis Three: Russian Citizens' and Firms' Use of the Courts
is Linked to Attitudes Regarding Law and the Legal System in
Russia
The link between attitude and behavior when it comes to court has
been difficult to establish. Tyler's work has sought to establish a causal
connection between citizens' beliefs in the legitimacy of law and their com-
pliance with the law and engagement with the legal system.129 His work is
grounded in the experience of the United States, where few would question
the basic legitimacy of the legal system. Instead, his work focuses on the
extent of procedural protections and the protection of litigants' right to dig-
nity. Without questioning the importance of the work of Tyler and others
who have come in his stead,130 my question is qualitatively different.
Russia has a very different legal culture from the United States.
Neither the legitimacy of the legal system nor the basic law-abiding charac-
ter of its citizens can be assumed (as Tyler is able to do with the United
States).131 In addition, I am looking not solely at compliance with the law
(which is Tyler's primary concern), but am exploring this as part of a strat-
egy to mobilize the law to advance or defend one's interests in court. In
128. See Hendley, supra note 4, at 305.
129. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Identity and Deference to the Law:
What Shapes Rule-Following in a Period of Transition?, 61 AusmT. J. PSYCHOL. 1 (2009);
Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U.
L. REv. 361 (2001); TYLER, supra note 10.
130. See, e.g., GENN, supra note 1.
131. Kahn, supra note 45, at 514-20; Ledeneva, supra note 107.
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this section, I explore the extent to which my respondents' beliefs about the
integrity of the Russian political and legal systems drive their willingness to
be involved with the courts.
Public opinion polling has presented a mixed picture on Russians' atti-
tudes towards their courts. Several reputable survey centers have sought to
assess the level of trust in this institution. The results from a series of
nationally representative surveys that the Levada Center conducted from
2001 to 2007 paint a rather dismal picture. Less than 20% of those sur-
veyed expressed complete trust in courts. Over a quarter of those surveyed
had no trust whatsoever and the remainder was ambivalent.13 2 INDEM's
2008 survey also queried Russian individuals and businessmen about their
trust in the courts.13 3 Fewer of their respondents expressed ambivalence,
which affected the levels of trust and distrust. The INDEM survey found
that well over 40% of both groups expressed trust, though for most it was a
weak endorsement. Among individuals, only 5.7% had complete trust
(polnost'iu doveriaiu). For the remaining 39.8%, their trust was decidedly
lukewarm (shoree doveriaiu). The same dynamic was at play for business-
men, with 3.7% expressing complete trust, while the rest (39.5%) were less
enthusiastic. The same pattern is present, albeit in a less striking form,
among those who are distrustful of the courts. Among the 37.7% of indi-
viduals who professed their lack of trust, 10.8% expressed complete dis-
trust (polnost'iu nedoveriaiu), whereas of the 45.3% of businessmen who
indicated a lack of trust, 9.3% fell into this extreme category. The rest were
less definitive in their expressions of distrust (skoree nedoveriaiu). Each of
these polls has its flaws. In particular, the tendency to ask about trust in
courts without specifying what type of court is problematic for a judicial
system with three distinctly different types of courts.
For most Russians, the lack of public trust in the courts is taken as an
article of faith.1 34 Indeed, it is this bedrock belief in the lack of societal
132. The trend was hopeful. The results from 2001 and 2007 showed an increase in
trust from 13% to 17%. At the other end of the spectrum, during the same period, the
distrust fell from 30% to 26%. Russians were even more distrustful of police and prose-
cutors, the other key institutions within the Russian legal system. On the other hand,
almost two-thirds of those surveyed expressed complete trust in the President. Doveria
institutam viasti, LEVADA-CENTER (Apr. 9, 2007), http://old.levada.ru/press/2007040901.
html. Putting such data in comparative context is difficult due to the fact that each
survey poses its question in a slightly different way. Yet it is worth noting that surveys
of attitudes towards courts in some advanced industrialized countries also reflected low
levels of trust. Only 25% of those surveyed expressed "a great deal" of confidence in
their courts. See GREENBERG QUINLAN POSNER RESEARCH, INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE: FRE-
QUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 3 (2001), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/
JASNationalSurveyResults -6F537F99272D4.pdf. At the other end of the scale, however,
only 5% expressed a complete lack of trust. Russians believe that trust in the courts in
the United States is deep. An article reporting on survey results for Russia claimed that
60%-80% of Americans had confidence in their courts. See Nedoverie k rossiiskim
sudam neprekronno rastyot, ZASUDILI (Feb. 20, 2011), http://zasudili.ru/news/index.php
?ID=940.
133. The INDEM survey went on to investigate the underlying causes of trust (or dis-
trust). This is certainly an important question, but is beyond the scope of this Article.
GORBUZ ET AL., supra note 46, at 386-87.
134. See Lilia Mirza, KriZis doveriia v sudu, 12 CHELOVEK I ZAKON 51, 51-58 (2008).
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legitimacy of the courts that makes the increase in the number of cases so
puzzling.' 35 Although a full discussion of the reasons why Russians con-
sistently express a lack of trust in their courts is beyond the scope of this
Article, it is worth noting that some Russian judicial leaders have attrib-
uted the public's lack of confidence in the courts to the lack of trans-
parency that has traditionally characterized the courts.' 36 Others have
dismissed it as a reflection of the general lack of trust in state
institutions.' 3 7
A. Law-Related Attitudes as an Explanation for Why Russian
Individuals Interact with the Courts
In exploring the role of attitudes in explaining Russians' contact with
the courts, the RLMS survey included two sets of variables of potential
interest. The first goes to respondents' attitudes towards state institutions
generally and their commitment to progressive ideals. Just as with capac-
ity, which looked to behavior vis-d-vis state institutions, the level of trust in
basic state institutions is worth exploring. I am looking to see whether
trust in the state affects the willingness to become involved with the courts.
We might also assume that those who are more receptive to progressive
135. In a March 2010 interview, Veniamin lakovlev, the former Chief Justice of the
Higher Arbitrazh Court argued that the increase in case filings reflects a greater confi-
dence in the courts. He expressed skepticism about the validity of public opinion pol-
ling, noting that those unsuccessful litigants prefer to attribute their results to judicial
corruption or incompetence rather than problems in their own cases. See Aleksandr
Pilipchuk, Veniamin lahovIev ob urovne doveriia k sudam i MVD dlia "Pravo.Ru": "Zachem
sledstviiu nuzhny aresty, PRAvo (Mar. 29, 2010), http://pravo.ru/news/view/27117/. Of
course, the flaw in his reasoning is that, even with the increased number of cases, the
vast majority of Russians have never had any personal experience with the courts.
136. In a September 2011 interview, Valeria Adamova, Chief Judge of the cassation
court for the region of Moscow, commented that, "In Russia, there is an ingrained bad
habit to indiscriminately criticize our judicial system. I think our consciousness is just
set up that way. Perhaps the reason is that the judiciary is not yet fully transparent."
Mikhail Barshchevskii, Arbitrazhnyi sud othryvaetsia, ROSSIYSKA1A GAZETA (Sept. 15,
2011), http://www.rg.ru/2011/09/15/adamova.html. On the challenges of improving
transparency in the courts, see N.V. Alekseeva & V.V. Efimova, Dostupnost' pravosudiia v
usioviiakh razvitiia informatsinnogo obshchestva Rossiikoi Federatsii, 2 RossIlSKOE
PRAVOSUDIE 70-73 (2010); L.A. Chastilova & E.S. Burmistrova, Otkrytnost' sudebnoi sis-
temy. Problema balansa interesov, 6 RoSSIISKOE PRAVOSUDIE 49 (2010); Lilia Mirza, Sud
okazalsia zakrytym ot naroda, 1 CHELOVEK I ZAKON 25 (2009). As of July 1, 2010, a law
requiring courts to post their decisions on the internet went into effect. See Ob
obespechenii dostupa k informatsii o deiatel'nosti sudov v Rossiiskoi Federatsii
[Sobranie zakonodatel'stva RF] [Civil Code] no. 52, ch. 1, art. 6217. Most observers
believe that the arbitrazh courts have done a better job of providing full access to their
activities than have the courts of general jurisdiction. See generally V.I. Reshetniak, K
voprosu ob elektronnom pravosudii v arbitrazhnom i grazhdansk om sudoproizvodstve, 9
1URIST 33-38 (2011); "Otkrytost"' sudebnoi sistemy kak uslovie ee nezavisimosti, 10 ZAKON
26-37 (2009); N.N. Fedoseeva, Dostup k informatsit o deiatel'nosti sudov v Rossitskoi
Federatsii, ADMINISTRATOR SUDA (Sept. 15, 2011), http://justicemaker.ru/view-
article.php?id=15&art=2160.
137. The Chief Justice of the Russian Constitutional Court, Valerii Zor'kin, took this
position in an undated interview published on the website of the press service
"Evropeiski-Aziatskii novosti." See Nedoverie k rossiiskim sudam neprekronno rastyot,
supra note 132.
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ideals would be more willing to use the courts. While most social scien-
tists accept that attitudes color behavior, whether I have identified the atti-
tudes that unlock the use of courts remains to be seen.
The second set of variables goes more directly to attitudes regarding
law and legal institutions. Social scientists who study the use of courts
generally assume that prospective litigants are greatly influenced by their
beliefs related to courts and law.' 38 This stands to reason. Those who
doubt the integrity of judges or the legitimacy of law are unlikely to rely on
these very institutions when resolving disputes.
As to the first set of variables, respondents were asked about their trust
in various state institutions.13 9 These included the government of the Rus-
sian Federation, the state duma (legislature), the courts, the army, and the
police. Though there is some danger that respondents personalized the
institutions and that their responses go more to support for the central
government (discussed below), the questions were framed in general
terms. I pulled the responses together in a scale of support. Fearing that I
would stack the deck by including attitudes specifically about courts, I
excluded responses about the courts. (The impact of trust in courts is dis-
cussed below). I then created a dummy variable for those in the top 15% of
the scale. Model 3 shows high levels of trust in state institutions to be a
robust predictor of court contact, but the causal arrow runs in an unex-
pected direction. The odds of court involvement are about 27% less for
those who trust state institutions than for those who are openly distrustful
of the state.
Respondents were also asked a series of questions about how impor-
tant it was to them personally that various democratic principles exist in
Russia. The list encompassed free elections, law and order, freedom of
speech, an independent press, political opposition, fair courts, and the pro-
tection of civil rights. I created a scale of their support for these progres-
sive ideals, once again leaving aside the question that was specifically
related to courts.140 When I included a variable in Model 3 that isolated
the top quartile, as those who are most supportive of these progressive ide-
als, we see that such beliefs are significantly related to court contact. As
might be expected, those who endorse these ideas are more likely to turn to
the courts.
At first glance, it would seem that these two scales ought to be comple-
mentary. Taken together, they would seem to provide a rough index for
respondents' support of democracy. The first scale measures their trust in
the three branches of government, and the second assesses their support
for citizens' civil liberties. These are two central components of democ-
racy. How can we make sense of the divergent results for the two variables
within the regression analysis? Perhaps the assumption that trust in the
138. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 10.
139. Using trust in state institutions as a measure of legitimacy is standard. See id.;
Stefan Machura, Fairness, Justice, and Legitimacy: Experiences of People's Judges in South-
ern Russia, 25 LAw & POL'Y 123 (2003).
140. Over 90% of those surveyed supported the importance of fair courts.
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three branches of government comes with a support for the existence of the
sort of checks and balances between them that make democracy work is
unfounded. It may be that respondents are comfortable with a more
authoritarian vision, in which power is concentrated in the executive
branch. The fact that there is only an 8% correlation between the two
indexes suggests this may be true. But linking the "trust" variable to the
current Putin/Medvedev institutional structure, which is generally
acknowledged to have slipped towards authoritarianism,14 ' is problematic.
The several variables in the survey that could be used as proxies for sup-
port for the current regime are not significantly related to court use.' 4 2
Turning now to factors that are more directly related to the legal sys-
tem itself, I asked several questions aimed at revealing respondents' atti-
tudes toward law. They were asked to express their opinion on the
following statements on a five-point scale ranging from completely agree to
completely disagree:
1. If a person considers a law to be unfair, he has the right to "evade"
(oboiti) it.
2. Judges in Russia are "for sale" (prodazhny).
3. In Russia, it is impossible to live without violating the law.
4. If a high state or political official does not obey the law, then ordinary
people are entitled to disregard the law as well.
Not surprisingly, the answers to these questions were highly correlated.
Even so, their predictive power as to contact with the courts was not uni-
form. The first question, which can be seen as a proxy for legal nihilism,
turns out to be unrelated to court use. This is unexpected: logic dictates
that those who are disdainful of the law would be unlikely to turn to the
courts.143 1 used the third statement as emblematic of the others and cre-
ated dummy variables for agreement, ambivalence, and disagreement.
Using those who disagreed as the reference category, the results show that
the odds of having been to court are about 33% greater for those who agree
that living in Russia without violating the law is impossible than for those
who think it is possible to live a law-abiding life in Russia (see Model 3 in
Table 3). Again, this is perplexing at first glance. Why would those who
believe in the legitimacy of the legal system be less willing to go to court?
More pointedly, why are those who are contemptuous of the legal system
be willing to trust the courts to resolve their disputes? This is a finding
that deserves more study. Perhaps need trumps ideology.
141. See, e.g., Andrew Osborn, Dmitry Medvedev's Russia Still Feels the Cold Hand of
Vladimir Putin, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 7, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world
news/europe/russia/7386448/Dmitry-Medvedevs-Russia-still-feels-the-cold-hand-of-
Vladimir-Putin.html.
142. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with two statements that go to the
essence of Putin's reforms, namely limiting elected officials to two consecutive terms
and appointing (rather than electing) regional governors. Supporters of these Putin poli-
cies were not more or less likely to have had contact with the courts.
143. Kathryn Hendley, Comments at the American Political Science Association:
Legal Nihilism in Russia (Sept. 2, 2010).
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A second set of questions were aimed at uncovering the practical
obstacles to the use of courts. The possible obstacles were: cost, delays,
inability to enforce decisions, judges' biases, and judges' incompetence.
These factors naturally divide into two categories. The first three possible
obstacles go to the institutional integrity of the courts, whereas the last two
go to the quality of the judicial corps. Because the answers to each subset
of questions were highly correlated, I focus on just one result from each as
an exemplar. Respondents were asked to state whether each factor inter-
fered (meshaet), either seriously or not, or did not interfere (ne meshaet),
either seriously or not, with their willingness to appeal (obrashchat'sia) to
the courts.t 44 They were also given the opportunity to opt out of answer-
ing due to the difficulty of the question. This choice (as well as the choice
to refuse to answer) was available for all questions within the RLMS.
Respondents took advantage of it to a greater extent with regard to this
question.' 4 5 With regard to each of my exemplars, I created dummy vari-
ables that captured those who saw the factor as an obstacle, those who did
not view it as an obstacle, and those who found it too difficult to answer.
The regression analysis takes the optimists-those who did not see it as an
obstacle-as the reference category.
As to the institutional viability of the courts, I focused on delays. The
Russian procedural codes contain strict deadlines for resolving disputes.
They vary depending on the type of dispute. 14 6 The ability of judges to
meet these deadlines is a critical factor in determining salaries and promo-
tions.14 7 Not surprisingly, judges in both the arbitrazh courts and the
courts of general jurisdiction are preoccupied with meeting these dead-
lines.148 Despite the best efforts of judges, cases often take longer than the
designated period, leading to frustration for some because foot-dragging
tactics are occasionally employed to dodge responsibility and/or encourage
settlement.1 4 9 Thus, assigning the ultimate responsibility for delays in
144. See ADULT QUESTIONNAIRE, ROUND 8, RussIA LONGITUDINAL MONITORING SURVEY, at
39J, available at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse/data/questionnaires/r8
adult.pdf.
145. An analysis of what this response means more generally is outside the scope of
this Article. The reasons why the "difficult to answer" option was more popular for this
set of questions are unclear. Unlike the battery of questions about attitudes towards
law, respondents were not given any other response that allowed them to express ambiv-
alence. See Ellen Carnaghan, Alienation, Apathy, or Ambivalence? "Don't Knows" and
Democracy in Russia, 55 SLAVIC REV. 325 (1996). The organizers of BEEPS chose not to
give their respondents this option.
146. See Hendley, supra note 4, at 4-5.
147. See id. at 5.
148. In my interviews with Russian judges, these deadlines (sroky) were a constant
topic of discussion. Hendley, supra note 115. Russian judges are always amazed to
learn that their U.S. counterparts do not have analogous temporal constraints. The offi-
cial caseload statistics paint a generally positive picture. In both hierarchies of courts,
violations of the deadlines are the exception rather than the rule. But these data sets are
misleading. Judges have numerous tools for tolling the clock. As a result, a case that has
ostensibly been decided within the statutory period has often taken longer than the
prescribed several weeks or months.
149. See Hendley, supra note 4, at 13-14.
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individual cases can be difficult. Without question, however, society
places the blame for delays squarely on the shoulders of judges.15 0 Table 6
indicates that whether one views delays as an obstacle or not has no dis-
cernable impact on contact with the court. Instead, it is those who found
the question too difficult to respond to who are staying away from the
courts in droves. Though I did not include this variable in the regression
analysis in the Article, the results were entirely consistent with the descrip-
tive statistics. Only the results for those in the ambiguous category of "too
difficult to respond" were significant.
The same dynamic, albeit in a slightly weaker form, is at play when it
comes to the incompetence of judges as an obstacle to using the courts. It
stands to reason that incompetent judges would serve as a disincentive to
going to court, and they do. The strength of the predictive relationship is
not as strong as for delays, but is present. The odds of having had contact
with the court are about 17% lower for those who identify the low profes-
sional level of judges as a serious obstacle as compared to those who had
no worries on this front. Once again, respondents who found the question
too difficult to answer were the group least likely to have had contact with
the courts. This pattern suggests that an unwillingness to answer these
questions does not reflect ambivalence. Rather, it may be an indicator of
hostility to state institutions.
Given the power of generational differences in explaining court con-
tact, I wondered whether age might lie at the heart of the results for these
attitudinal variables. I explored this by reviewing the mean values for the
attitudinal variables for each of the age cohorts. The differences between
the generations is not meaningful, suggesting that age is not terribly
relevant.
Despite the fascination of social scientists and policy makers with
explanations for the use or non-use of courts that flow from litigants'
underlying attitudes,151 this set of variables is rather disappointing. They
add little to the power of the model. The pseudo-r2 value increases from
0.191 to 0.198.152 There is no question that respondents' beliefs about law
and legal institutions are part of the story, but it appears that they take a
back seat to the more material interests that need and capacity represent.
150. Id. at 8.
151. Such assumptions are often reflected in comments that bemoan the lack of the
"rule of law" in Russia and blame the failure of various reform processes on its supposed
absence. See, e.g., ANDERS ASLUND, BUILDING CAPITALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FORMER SOVIET BLOc 369-70 (2001); MICHAEL MCFAUL, RUSSIA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION:
POLrlCAL CHANGE FROM GORBACHEV TO PUTIN 326-28 (2002).
152. Fearing that the large number of variables included in Model 3 might be blunt-
ing the effect of these attitudinal variables, I re-ran the regression with only the variables
I added in this model, the variables that capture the respondents' attitudes. The pseudo-
r2 was 0.0140, confirming the limited value of attitudes in explaining contact by Rus-
sian individuals with the courts.
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B. Law-Related Attitudes as an Explanation for Why Russian Firms
Resort to the Courts
A fundamental assumption of the social science literature on the role
of law in the post-Soviet economy is that Russian economic actors were
distrustful of law and legal institutions, and that this distrust led them to
avoid the courts. Several Western scholars-who served as key advisors to
the Russian government on the legal reforms attendant to the transition to
the market-took the position that the Russian courts were simply
unusable.'53 The Russian media never tires of telling stories of how law
has failed to protect firms and of sharing the intricacies of sordid
lawsuits.' 54
BEEPS sought the opinions of firm management about a wide range of
law-related issues. In particular, the respondent firms were asked about
the predictability and accessibility of law. These are issues at the heart of
the "rule of law" concept.' 55 Firms were asked to agree or disagree with
two statements and to peg their response along a six-point scale. A
response of 1 indicated strong disagreement; a response of 6 indicated
strong agreement. Both questions framed the statements in the positive.
Thus higher mean scores signify a stronger belief in the integrity of the
legal system. As to predictability, firms were asked their views of the fol-
lowing statement: "interpretation of the laws and regulations affecting my
firm are consistent and predictable." The mean response of 3.11 indicates
that firms were divided about this question. A majority (54%) opted for
middle-of-the road answers (tend to agree; tend to disagree). Yet confidence
in the stability of law (or the lack thereof) was only weakly tied to firms'
propensity to litigate, and the relationship was negative. Firms that found
the law to be stable were less likely to have been to court. In a perverse
way, this makes sense. If a firm is confident about the outcome of a dis-
pute-if the law is predictable-then there is no need to submit the case to
the courts because the outcome is predetermined. Settling such cases is
more efficient. This result greatly surprised me.
In my research in the arbitrazh courts from 1995 to 2007, 1 had been
struck by the tendency of Russian firms to use the courts as a debt collec-
153. Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109
HARv. L. REV. 1911 (1996); Hay & Shleifer, supra note 11, at 401.
154. In addition to the politically inspired cases referenced earlier, see supra note 14,
the Russian press also aggressively covers the practice of "raiding" (reiderstvo) within the
Russian economy. This refers to the propensity of business rivals in Russia to criminal-
ize their disputes. They seek civil damages through the arbitrazh courts and also con-
vince the authorities to pursue criminal charges against their rivals in the courts of
general jurisdiction. See, e.g., Vladimir Barinov, 'Nochnoi gubenator Peterburga' sel kak
reketir, IZVESTIA, Mar. 7, 2012, at 3; Vladislav Trifonov, Vladimir Barsukov vosprinial sud
boleznenno, KOMMERSANT DAILY, July 28, 2011, at 5; Vadim Smirnov, Navernoe, eto
reiderstvo, VREMYA NOVOSTEl, Apr. 27, 2010, at 4. For an overview of "raiding" in Russia,
see Thomas Firestone, Armed Injustice: Abuse of the Law and Complex Crime in Post-Soviet
Russia, 38 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 555 (2010).
155. See Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 60 ADmiN. L.
REV. 647, 653 (2008); Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?,
42 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1375, 1418 (2009).
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tion agency. I witnessed countless cases where the outcome surprised no
one, but where the parties wanted a court judgment. In the 1990s, I attrib-
uted this predilection to the pervasive uncertainty and the desire to have
definitive proof of the validity of outstanding debts for the tax authori-
ties.' 56 Kagan's work on the patterns of court use in the United States in
the early 1900s suggest that many legal systems go through a period where
litigation is over-used (1984).157 It may be that Russia is now emerging
from that stage.
Transparency is a different story. First of all, respondents were more
sanguine about access. They were asked to agree or disagree with the fol-
lowing statement: "information on the laws and regulations affecting my
firm is easy to obtain." The higher mean of 3.95 points to gains in trans-
parency for the Russian legal system thanks to the advent of multiple com-
puterized databases. In addition, the odds of pursuing a claim to court are
about two-thirds greater for firms that are easily able to secure legal infor-
mation. This result is to be expected. Firms that understand the law are
better able to prepare themselves for the judicial process, thereby enhanc-
ing their capacity to protect themselves in the courts.
Another frequent refrain in the literature is the inability of Russian
courts to protect property rights.' 58 My research has argued against this
proposition. I have argued that the arbitrazh courts' protection of creditors'
rights in non-payment cases stacks up well in the comparative context.' 59
Most of these cases have relatively low stakes. Others have contended that
the courts' adherence to the letter of the law weakens when the interests of
powerful economic or political actors are at stake, as in bankruptcy
cases.160 This empirical question of whether property rights are effectively
protected is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, the BEEPS data allow
us to explore whether Russian firm managers believe the courts will
enforce the law and, more importantly, whether their feelings on this ques-
tion drive their behavior. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with
the following statement: "I am confident that the legal system will uphold
my contract and property rights in business disputes." They were given the
now-familiar six-point scale. The mean of 3.02 falls in the zone of weak
disagreement (tend to disagree), telling us the surveyed firms are skeptical
about the willingness of the arbitrazh courts to live up to the strictures of
the law. But contrary to the implicit assumption of the social science litera-
156. Hendley, supra note 4, at 305.
157. See Robert A. Kagan, The Routinization of Debt Collection: An Essay on Social
Change and Conflict in the Courts, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 323 (1984).
158. See Andrei Shleifer, Establishing Property Rights, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD
BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENTAL ECONOMICS 1994 93 (1995); Timothy
Frye, Credible Commitment and Property Rights: Evidence from Russia, 98 AM. POL. SCi.
REV. 453 (2004); Simon Johnson et al., Entrepreneurs and the Ordering of Institutional
Reform: Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine Compared, 8 EcON. TRANSnON 1
(2000).
159. Hendley, supra note 4, at 305.
160. Anna Lambert-Mogiliansky et al., Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evi-
dence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant, 35 J. Comp. ECON. 254 (2007).
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ture, this agnosticism about the protection of property rights does not
drive behavior. I divided the responses to this question into three groups:
firms that agreed that courts would protect their property rights; firms that
were ambivalent on this score; and firms that did not believe that their
rights would be upheld. Both the descriptive statistics and the regression
analysis document that firms' attitudes about property rights play no role
in predicting their use (or non-use) of the courts. This result deserves fur-
ther investigation. My instincts tell me that in an institutional context
where going to court imposes few costs-either financial or relational-
firms are willing to try it even if they harbor doubts about its efficacy.
This takes us to the question of firms' attitudes towards the courts. As
part of BEEPS, there were two approaches to this topic. Much as in the
RLMS, respondents were asked about possible obstacles to using the
courts, but then an effort was made to put their attitudes towards courts
into a larger framework. Firms were given a list of twenty-one factors that
might affect the growth and operation of their businesses, including the
functioning of the judiciary, and were asked to evaluate their impact.
As to the putative obstacles, respondents were given a list of five quali-
ties that might be used to describe the courts and were asked to assess how
often they associated the phrase with the courts on a six-point scale, rang-
ing from never to always.161 As in the RLMS, the qualities break down into
factors that determine the institutional integrity of the courts (quick,
affordable, and able to enforce its decisions) and those that shape the qual-
ity of the judicial corps (fair and impartial, honest, and uncorrupted). My
analysis reveals that firms are largely unaffected by concerns over the per-
sonal integrity of judges, but that their views about the institutional capa-
bility of the courts do play a role in their decisions about how to handle
disputes. The means for the questions about judicial character were
around 2.6, indicating that they associated the qualities of fairness/impar-
tiality and honesty with judges somewhere between seldom and some-
times. The responses were highly correlated (0.75). For that reason, I
included only one of them-honesty-in the regression analysis. It indi-
cates that the apparent lack of trust in decision-makers is not helpful in
predicting whether a firm will use the courts.
On the other hand, attitudes about institutional factors were more
helpful. The surveyed firms were most concerned about delays. Very few
firms saw the judicial process as expeditious. Just the opposite: the mean
response of 2.12 tells us that the average firm said that they would seldom
describe litigation as quick.162 I divided the sample into firms that were
highly skeptical (responding that they would never or seldom describe the
161. The scale was: never (1), seldom (2), sometimes (3), frequently (4), usually (5),
and always (6).
162. The procedural code for the arbitrazh courts mandates that most cases be
decided within three months of filing. Although this might seem quick to those accus-
tomed to the more leisurely pace of American courts, Russian economic actors are frus-
trated by having to wait weeks for a resolution to their disputes. This serves to remind
us that all questions of time are relative.
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process as quick), those that expressed ambivalence (responding that they
would sometimes describe the process as quick), and those that were less
troubled (responding that they would frequently, usually, or always
describe the process as quick). Not surprisingly, the odds of going to
court are significantly lower for firms that are skeptical about the effi-
ciency of the courts. Those that are ambivalent are only slightly less dis-
couraged by the prospect of going to court. The results are much the same
for firms that are troubled by the cost of litigation. As a group, the sur-
veyed firms are less worried about this factor, as is illustrated by the mean
response of 3.04. It indicates that the average firm said it would some-
times describe litigation as affordable. Even so, firms that fell into my cate-
gories of being skeptical or ambivalent about the cost were less inclined to
use the courts. The strength of the relationship is stronger than that for
speed. Both results make sense. Firms that regard the courts as slow or
expensive are hardly likely to flock to them.
The final institutional factor is the ability to enforce decisions. The
literature assumes arbitrazh court decisions are not typically imple-
mented.163 In an earlier project, I tested this common wisdom empirically
by examining what happened in non-payments cases. Although my sample
was admittedly not representative, my results suggested that enforcement
was not as much of a problem as had been thought.164 The BEEPS data
tend to support my findings. The mean response of 3.3 shows that enforce-
ment was the institutional factor that was least troubling to the surveyed
firms. Indeed, when put into the regression, it turns out that the odds of
using the courts are actually much greater for firms that view enforcement
as a problem than for those who are untroubled. This seems incongruous,
until we consider that firms may recognize that implementation is more
their responsibility than that of the judicial system. Struggles with enforce-
ment may be regarded as a necessary part of the litigation process. Once
again, need may trump other concerns.
How do firms' concerns about the judicial process stack up against
other problems? I explored this by comparing the mean scores for the
twenty-one potential areas of concern that were included in a question that
asked firms to assess how problematic these factors are for the "operation
and growth" of their businesses along a four-point scale that ranged from
"no obstacle" with a score of 1, to "major obstacle" with a score of 4.
According to this scale, higher means indicate greater concern. From this
vantage point, the functioning of the judiciary emerges as a mid-level con-
cern. It can be grouped together with six other potential problems that
have mean scores between 1.8 and 2.1. These include: customs and trade
regulations, business licensing and permits, street crime, contractual
breaches by suppliers and customers, access to financing, and the availabil-
ity of skilled workers. At the other end of spectrum, with lower mean
scores, are more prosaic problems, such as electricity, telecommunications,
163. See, e.g., FEDERICO VARESE, THE RussiAN MAFIA: PRIVATE PROTECTION IN A NEW MAR-
KET EcoNomv 46-50 (2001).
164. Hendley, supra note 4, at 305.
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access to land, and titling of land. Oddly enough, concern over organized
crime also falls into this group. The surveyed firms are most troubled by
uncertainty over regulatory policy, tax policy, and general macroeconomic
instability (including inflation). The mean scores for this latter group were
over 2.5.
This exercise helps put Russian firms' fears about the operation of the
courts into a larger context. It reminds us that the post-Soviet economic
environment presents firms with a multitude of challenges, of which the
judicial system is just one. Moreover, when I examined the role of this
variable in predicting the use of courts, I found that it was not relevant. I
created a dummy variable to isolate those who regard the functioning of
the courts as a moderate or major obstacle (30% of the sample). Some-
what bizarrely, the descriptive statistics indicate that those who see the
courts as an obstacle are actually more likely to use them. This variable is
not significant in the regression analysis.
Much as with the analysis of Russian individuals, this analysis of the
role of attitudes in explaining the litigation behavior of firms is somewhat
underwhelming. As between Models 4 and 5, the pseudo-r2 value
increases from 0.2441 to 0.2983.165 The analysis confirms the common
wisdom that firms are troubled by the institutional shortcomings of the
courts. It also reinforces the belief that Russian economic actors doubt
whether courts will enforce their contract and property rights. But it shat-
ters the assumption that this lack of faith leads them to avoid the courts.
VI. Reflections on the Role of Legitimacy in Explaining Contact with
the Courts
Going to court requires the parties to place their faith in the judge and
in the integrity of the process. Social scientists have assumed that societal
distrust would translate into a general unwillingness to use the courts. 166
In the Russian context, public opinion polling has consistently docu-
mented the public's lack of trust in courts. 167 Commentators have typi-
cally assumed that Russians are avoiding the courts.168 The caseload data
belie this simplistic behavioral assumption. My analysis provides some
insight into this puzzle. It suggests that, for both individuals and firms,
this upswing in litigation is driven primarily by a complex intersection of
factors related to need and capacity. On its own, this finding is not sur-
prising. Both need and capacity are essential prerequisites to litigation.
More unexpected is the fact that respondents' general societal aversion to
165. Fearing that the pseudo-r2 might be driven by the large number of variables
included in Model 6, I reran the regression with only the variables I added in this model,
i.e., the variables that capture the respondent firms' attitudes towards the courts. The
pseudo-r2 was 0.0446, confirming the limited value of attitudes in explaining firms' use
of courts.
166. See Kathryn Hendley, Growing Pains: Balancing Justice & Efficiency in the Russian
Economic Courts, 12 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L. J. 301, 304 (1998).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 132-133.
168. See Hay & Shleifer, supra note 11, at 401.
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the courts did not deter them from taking their claims to the courts when
the need presented itself. This result calls into question the proclivity of
policy makers to link the legitimacy of the courts to citizens' willingness to
use these institutions. My research is, of course, limited to Russia.
Although Russians' disdain for their courts would seem to make it a tough
case, whether my results will hold up in a broader comparative context
remains to be seen. Further research is certainly warranted.
VII. Tables
Table 1: Contact with the Courts by Respondents in Rounds 13 and
15 of the RLMS
2004 2006
(Round 13) (Round 15)
Respondent personally had contact with the courts 11.8 13.3
Friends or family of the respondent had contact 15.2 18.1
with the courts
No one close to the respondent had contact with 73 68.5
the courts
Source: Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey - Higher School of Economics, U.N.C.,
CAROLINA POPULATION CENTER, http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse/data.
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Table 2: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents in Round 15 of
RLMS (2006)
Personal No personal
contact contact with Full Chi
with courts courts sample value
Full Sample 13.2 86.8 100
Gender:
Men 13.9 86.1 42.6
Women 12.6 87.4 57.4 p>.05
Education
No university degree 12 88 80.9
University degree 18.1 81.9 19.1 p>.0 1
Marital Status
Divorced at some point 20.2 79.8 14.7
Never divorced (married or 11.9 88.1 85.3 p>.01
unmarried)
Income
Top three quartiles 12.6 87.4 76
Bottom quartile 15 85 24 p>'.01
Employed
Currently employed (or on 16.2 83.8 54.6
paid leave)
Unemployed 9.5 90.5 45.4 p>.0 1
Location
Urban 14 86 68.3
Rural 11.5 88.5 31.7 p>.01
Ethnicity
Russian 13.6 86.4 87
Not Russian 12.8 87.2 13 n.s.
Age
Born before 1940 7.2 92.8 15.8
Born 1941-1950 13.2 86.8 10.2
Born 1951-1969 17 83 31
Born 1970-1976 18.3 81.7 13.1
Born 1977-1987 12.8 87.2 21.5
Born after 1988 3.2 96.8 8.4 p>.0 1
Source: Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey - Higher School of Economics, U.N.C.,
CAROLINA POPULATION CENTER, http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse/data.
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Table 3: Logistic Regression Models - Odds Ratios for Contact with
Courts by Russian Individuals in Round 15 of RLMS (2006)
VARIABLES
Women
Ever divorced
Urban residents
Russian
Born before 1940 (reference
category)
Born 1941-1950
Born 1951-1969
Born 1970-1976
Born 1977-1987
Born after 1988
Employed
University graduate
Family situation worsened over
past year
Consulted lawyer
Used two other state institutions
Perception of power unchanged
since 2002 (R11) (reference
category)
Perception of increased power
since 2002 (R11)
Perception of decreased power
since 2002 (R11)
Trust in government institutions
(top 15%)
Belief in progressive ideals (top
19%)
Low professional level of judges
not seen as obstacle (reference
category)
Low professional level of judges
seen as obstacle
Low professional level of judges
- ambivalent
Model 1
pseudo r2=.0437
0.845***
(0.0437)
1.836***
(0.135)
1.159**
(0.0828)
0.909
(0.0844)
1.802***
(0.235)
2.313***
(0.268)
2.535***
(0.325)
1.902***
(0.234)
0.526***
(0.110)
1.190**
(0.0867)
1.393***
(0.0957)
1.451***
(0.108)
Model 2
pseudo r2=.1910
0.772***
(0.0453)
1.840***
(0.153)
0.950
(0.0725)
0.912
(0.0899)
1.549***
(0.210)
1.812***
(0.218)
1.870***
(0.256)
1.638***
(0.212)
0.619**
(0.128)
1.026
(0.0802)
0.953
(0.0734)
1.309***
(0.106)
8.480***
(0.575)
1.644***
(0.141)
0.986
(0.0846)
0.686***
(0.736)
Model 3
pseudo r2=.1980
0.790***
(0.0469)
1.808***
(0.151)
0.946
(0.0735)
0.917
(0.0912)
1.452***
(0.198)
1.664***
(0.203)
1.704***
(0.238)
1.484***
(0.196)
0.605**
(0.126)
1.047
(0.0821)
0.932
(0.0721)
1.286***
(0.105)
8.224***
(0.650)
1.587***
(0.137)
0.961
(0.0830)
0.675***
(0.0727)
0.721***
(0.0805)
1.286***
(0.107)
0.754***
(0.0575)
0.637***
(0.0592)
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Disagree that living in Russia
without violating law is
impossible (reference category)
Agree that living in Russia
without violating law is
impossible 1.333***
(0.0981)
Ambivalent as to whether living
in Russia without violating law is
impossible 1.059
(0.0940)
Constant 0.0626*** 0.0530*** 0.0642***
(0.00896) (0.00871) (0.0119)
Observations 12,199 12,138 12,052
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey - Higher School of Economics, U.N.C.,
CAROLINA POPULATION CENTER, http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse/data.
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Table 4: Demographic Characteristics of Russian Firms in 2005 Round
of BEEPS
Firm had been to Firm had
court as plaintiff not been Full
or defendant to court sample Chi value
Full Sample 26.8 71.2 100
Size:
Large firms (over 39.4 60.6 12.1
250 employees)
Medium firms
(from 50-249 44 56 21.4
employees)
Small firms (less 19 81 66.5 p<0.01
than 50 employees)
Founding date of firm
Between 1878 and 44.4 55.6 20
1991
Between 1992 and 32.6 67.4 24.6
1995
Between 1996 and 18.3 81.7 26.2
1999
After 1999 17.5 82.5 29.2 p<0.01
Ownership
Privately owned 25.1 74.9 89.7
State owned 41.7 58.3 10.3 p<0.01
Location
Moscow 14 86 25.6
City of over 1 30 70 30.8
million residents
City of 250,000 to 39.8 60.2 15.9
1 million residents
City of 50,000 to 30.6 69.4 12.3
250,000 residents
City of less than 25.6 74.4 15.4 p<0.01
50,000 residents
Sector
Manufacturing / 29.9 70.1 26.8
Mining
Construction 34.6 65.4 13.8
Services 23.6 76.4 59.3 p<O.l
Source: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), EUROPEAN BANK
FOR RECONSTRuCON & DEVELOPMENT, http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/
data/beeps.shtml.
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Table 5: Logistic Regression Models - Odds Ratios for Use of Courts
by Russian Firms in 2005 Round of BEEPS
VARIABLES
Small firms (reference category)
Mid-sized firms (50-249
employees)
Large firms (more than 250
employees)
Firms founded from 1878 -1991
Firms founded from 1992-1995
Firms founded from 1996-1999
Firms founded after 2000
(reference category)
Moscow (reference category)
Cities of over 1 million residents
Cities of 250,000 to 1 million
residents
Cities of 50,000 to 250,000
residents
Cities with less than 50,000
residents
Firm owes money
Firms never use cash (reference
category)
Firms sometimes use cash
Firms always use cash
Firm has had non-payment
problems with customers
Member of business association
Law is basically predictable
Finding law is not a problem
Property rights are not protected
by courts
Ambivalent as to protection of
property rights
Property rights are protected by
courts (reference category)
Judges are not honest
Ambivalent about honesty of
judges
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
pseudo r2=.1072 pseudo r2=.2441 pseudo r2=.2983
2.846***
(0.676)
2.406***
(0.742)
2.265***
(0.678)
1.819**
(0.509)
0.926
(0.278)
2.433***
(0.734)
4.046***
(1.353)
2.624***
(0.970)
2.454**
(0.881)
2.084***
(0.552)
1.602
(0.552)
2.350***
(0.771)
1.982**
(0.613)
0.912
(0.297)
2.081**
(0.690)
2.061**
(0.696)
1.339
(0.472)
7.099***
(1.739)
1.528
(0.402)
2.174***
(0/615)
1.564
(0.570)
1.983**
(0.677)
1.887*
(0.611)
0.820
(0.284)
1.943*
(0.684)
1.555
(0.558)
1.125
(0.414)
7.453***
(1.990)
1.307
(0.377)
0.643*
(0.173)
1.598*
(0.405)
1.742
(0.679)
1.845*
(0.647)
1.026
(0.383)
1.301
(0.507)
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Judges are honest (reference
category)
Courts are slow 0.337**
(0.142)
Ambivalent about speed of
courts 0.368**
(0.178)
Courts are not slow (reference
category)
Courts are expensive 0.430***
(0.137)
Ambivalent about cost of courts 0.324***
(0.114)
Courts are not expensive
(reference category)
Court judges are rarely enforced 2.079**
(0.689)
Ambivalent about enforcement
problem 2.463***
(0.793)
Enforcement of judgments is not
a problem (reference category)
Functioning of courts is obstacle
to business 1.210
(0.324)
Constant 0.0797*** 0.0356*** 0.0688***
(0.0246) (0.0131) (0.0405)
Observations 585 585 585
seEform in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), EUROPEAN BANK
FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT, http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/
data/beeps.shtml.
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Regression
Analysis for RLMS
Personal No personal
contact with contact with
courts courts Full sample Chi value
Full Sample 13.2 86.8 100
Family situation over past year
Worse 17.3 82.7 16
Better or unchanged 12.5 87.5 84 p>. 0 1
Consulted with lawyer
Yes 41.5 58.5 18.9
No 6.6 93.4 81.1 p>. 0 1
Used two other state
institutions
28.2 77.8 13.2
No 11.1 88.9 86.8 p>.0 1
Perception of power over time
More 13.1 86.9 42.2
Same 11.8 88.2 25.5
Less 11.2 88.8 32.3 p>. 0 5
Trust in state institutions
High 8.6 91.4 14.8
Not High 14.4 85.6 85.2 p>. 0 1
Belief in progressive ideals
High 16 84 18.8
Not High 13 87 81.2 p>. 0 1
Impossible to live in Russia
without violating the law
Agree 16.5 83.5 43.7
Ambivalent 12.1 87.9 25.1
Disagree 11 89 31.2 p>. 0 1
Speed of litigation
Obstacle to going to 14.4 85.6 70
court
Not an obstacle to going 14.9 84.1 13.4
to court
Too difficult to answer 6.7 93.3 16.6 p>. 0 1
Low professional level of judges
Obstacle to going to 12.9 87.1 52.6
court
Not an obstacle to going 17.4 82.6 22
to court
Too difficult to answer 10 90 25.4 p>.0 1
Source: Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey - Higher School of Economics, U.N.C.,
CAROLINA POPULATION CENTER, http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse/data.
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Regression
Analysis for BEEPS
Firm had
been to
court as Firm had
plaintiff or not been to
defendant court Full sample Chi value
Full Sample 26.8 71.2 100
Non-payment
Firms that have had non-
payment problem with 48.7 51.3 44.3
customer in past 3 years
Firms with no non- 9.5 90.5 55.73 p<0 .01
payments problems
Debtor-creditor status
Firms that owe money for
utilities, taxes, wages, or 57.1 42.9 9.6
inputs
Firms that do not owe 23.6 76.3 90.4 p<0.01
money
Cash vs. credit
Firms that always use cash 30.2 69.8 35.4
Firms that sometimes use 32.3 67.7 39.7
cash
Firms that never use cash 11.4 88.6 24.9 p<0.01
Business association
Member 42.1 57.9 26.8
Non-member 23.1 76.9 73.2 p<0.01
Proximity to arbitrazh court
In city with arbitrazh court 26.4 73.6 67.3
Not in city with arbitrazh 27.8 72.2 32.7 n.s.
court
Concern over predictability of law
Not a problem 20.9 79.1 37.3
Seen as a problem 30.5 69.5 62.7 p<0.012
Ease of finding information about
laws
Not a problem 35 65 35.8
Seen as a problem 22.8 77.2 64.2 p<0.01
Concern over protection of
property rights by the courts
Not concerned 22.9 77.1 18.8
Ambivalent 28 72 49.4
Very concerned 29.6 70.4 31.8 n.s.
Concern over honesty of judges
Not concerned 29.4 70.6 20.2
Ambivalent 29.8 70.2 24.6
Very concerned 27.3 72.7 55.2 n.s.
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Concern over court delays
Not concerned 37.3 62.7 11.3
Ambivalent 25.7 74.3 19.3
Very concerned 28.9 71.1 59.4 n.s.
Concern over court costs
Not concerned 45.5 54.6 34
Ambivalent 20.5 79.5 24.8
Very concerned 20.9 79.1 41.2 p<0.01
Concern over ability to enforce
judgments
Not concerned 27 73 43.3
Ambivalent 35.7 64.3 25.1
Very concerned 28.4 71.6 31.6 n.s.
Courts as an obstacle
No obstacle or minor 25.7 74.3 70
obstacle
Moderate or major obstacle 37.6 62.4 30 p<0 .0 1
Source: Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey - Higher School of Economics, U.N.C.,
CAROLINA POPULATION CENTER, http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse/data.

